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PART I
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
A) differences between the judicial review in the U.S. and
in Germany
There are many differences between the german and the U.s.
legal system.
Besides one of the most obvious differences - a common law
and case by case system on one and a civil law system with
only written law on the other side - the source and the
purpose of the two legal systems differ in a fundamental and
eminent way: the U.s. law is made "by the people for the
people" whereas the law in Germany is made by elected
representatives to protect the rule of law.
The U.S. legal system is build upon the realization of the
introduction of the u.s. constitution: "We the people ..."
and refers to the will of the people as the main source of
the law.1 The german legal system's main aim is to establish
reliance in the whole legal system knowing and accepting
1 see: Winfried Brugger, "Verfassungen im Vergleich", in:
"Ruperto Carola, Forschungsmagazin der Universitaet
Heidelberg", 3/1994,22,23
1
2that this may oppose or even harm individuals.2 That of
course does not mean that the german legal system is enacted
only to serve legal principles but as all of the german laws
are enacted to serve an abstract and not an individual case,
the application of the law for an individual therefore may
be or can be more difficult because in a civil law system
there is more weight put on the abstract principles than on
certain individual problems.
In the U.S. the judges find the law and the judges represent
the people, sometimes assisted by a jury. Though of course
the jurors do not make the law - nobody will deny the great
impact this jury system has on the development and outcome
of the legal system.
The aim is to make law with "common sense" and with the
peoples will. with that the people have a greater influence
on how they want the law to be and in what direction this
legal system then really moves. Furthermore, as the elected
chief of the executive appoints the most important judges
these judges will find the law in a foreseeable way and most
often will represent and express the ideas about ethics and
law that the majority thinks is correct.
2 Eberhard SChmidt-Assmann, "Oer Rechtsstaat", 987,1030,
in: "Handbuch des Staatsrechts", ed. by J.Isensee/P.Kirchhof
3Beeing a representative democracy - Grundgesetz art 20 (2)3
- the only influence people in Germany have on the law is to
elect the members of Parliament but the fact that "their"
candidate is elected does not necessarily correspond with
their thoughts about the law and it has nothing to do with
the law the Parliament lateron will enact.
Of course the legal procedures that lead to an enactment of
a law do obey almost the same democratic necessities in both
countries - but nevertheless the people in the u.s. have
more influence on their representatives because
representatives in Germany first obey their party's will
before listening to the wishes of their voters. Doing this a
"fundamental change in the conventional, liberal form of
representative democracy" has occurred and produced a new
system, the "party state".4
Because the law is abstract nobody's special interests will
be thought of except for those interests presented by mighty
lobbyists with financial or other influence.
The judicial branch really is independent because all judges
have life tenure and can only be removed by impeachment.
More than that not the executive branch elects the judges
but there are certain commissions that appoint the judges.
3 Grundgesetz (GG), German Constitution, enacted May 23rd
1949; Beck-Texte im dtv, 31st ed.,February 1st 1994
4 see: Justice Prof. Dr. H. Steinberger, "Political
Representation in Germany", 121,128, in: "Germany and its
Basic Law", ed. by P.Kirchhof/ D.Kommers, (1993)
4The judges are not appointed because of their membership to
a certain political party or because they have certain
believes or opinions but because of their legal ability.5
The judicial branch is seen as a 'political' neutral and
independent branch that is the one with the knowledge and
the independence to say how the law is to be used and how
the law should be interpreted.
Not "common sense" or "people's opinions" but the
legislators intention and its aim is the main source
interpreting the law should there be doubts on how the law
was meant to be.
To balance the abstract and objective way with the
disadvantages that may occur to the individual each
individual has the constitutionally guaranteed entitlement
to sue before the Federal Constitutional Court6, GG art 93
(1) No 4.
Certain formal requirements have to be fulfilled, of course,
like standing and exhaustion of remedies,
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz7 sects. 90 - 96.
5 see: D.Clark, "The Selection and Accountability of Judges
in West Germany", 61 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1795,1818,1829 (1988)
6 Federal Constitutional Court (F.e.e.) =
Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), located in Karlsruhe
7 Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (BVerfGG), code with the
procedural rules, requirements and rights of the BVerfG
5There are about 3000 constitutional complaints each year8
and if the formal requirements are fulfilled the F.C.C. has
to review the lawsuit. The Justices of the F.C.C. do not
have the possibility to select the cases they think are most
important or interesting but they have to review all of
those constitutional claims if the formal requirements are
fulfilled.
Main aim of the F.C.C. is to protect the individual and
his/her constitutionally guaranteed rights9 whereas the main
aim of the Supreme Court is to give final decisions on
important questions and to establish legal uniformity in
cases where different courts decided nearly the same
problems in different ways.
This thesis will try to give an introduction into the
different systems of judicial review of administrative
actions of the United States and Germany. In this first part
a short introduction into the different legal systems and
administrative agencies will be given. Part II will explain
the system of judicial review of administrative actions in
Germany. After describing against which administrative
actions there is the possibility to obtain jUdicial review
8 J.Wieland, "Der Zugang zum Bundesverfassunsggericht und
zum Supreme Court", p.333, in: "Der Staat" 29, (1990),
9 this is the main aim of the BVerfG towards the individual
but it of course has other constitutional cases, like e.g.
claims between the federal and state governments or the
verification of compatibility of laws with the Grundgesetz
6there will be sections concerning the time when jUdicial
review has to be obtained, which different lawsuits exist as
well as when these lawsuits will be admitted and will be
successful. In Part III the american system of jUdicial
review of administrative actions will be presented. This
part will contain a general overview of the judicial review
in general as well as a description of the actions which are
reviewable by courts. There furthermore will be a section
dealing with the scope of review and the requirements that
are necessary to obtain judicial review of administrative
actions.
Part IV then will be engaged with the examination and the
comparison of the respective historic and cultural
influences on the development of the legal systems in
general and especially the jUdicial review of administrative
action. In this part the source of law, the purpose and the
aims of the law as well as the attitude towards the
government and the administrative agencies will be examined.
Part V will summarize the differences and similarities
concerning the judicial review of administrative actions in
the two legal systems and will arrange them in order with
the respective attitudes towards the law and the political
system. The Conclusion then will state the impacts of the
different legal systems on the jUdicial review of
administrative actions.
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1) administrative judicial branch
An important difference between the german and the u.s.
legal system is that there is the common belief in the u.s.
that a judge should not be specialized in a certain field of
law.
Instead of that the judge should be able to judge the cases
and problems that arise in different fields of law. This
system relies on the belief that people who are able to
judge problems in a general way are much better in obeying
the common sense and with this finding the law of the
people.
In the F.R.G. - though of course the law is meant to serve
the needs of the people - there are too many laws, the law
is too complex and there are too many special rules even for
legally trained persons to judge all legal problems that may
arise.
Therefore, there is not only the necessity to let people
who have been legally trained work with the law but more
than that there are different jUdicial branches for the most
important legal SUbjects; the three main court branches are
(a) civil law courts, (b) administrative law courts and
8
(c)"criminal law courts.~
Furthermore there are special courts that deal with legal
problems in commerce law, labor law, there are fiscal and
social courts.
There are five Supreme Courts in Germany above which there
still is the Federal Constitutional Court "which monitors
all state bodies, including the supreme Federal Courts
themselves, to ensure adherence to the constitution".11
To divide judges on different legal subjects is not a sign
of distrust in their legal (or even intellectual) capacity
but it is the proper way to ensure a fast and reliable
judicial branch because "only a well - timed jUdicial review
is a just judicial review".u
Too many special problems arise in each field of law and it
would take too much time for jUdges to adjust themselves to
the sometimes very different topics.
10 The opinion of Peter L. Strauss that the existence of
a special administrative court would violate the separation
of powers because the administrative court would put too
much power to the executive branch therefore is not
necessarily correct unless the administrative court would be
a part of the administrative agency; see: Peter L. Strauss,
"An Introduction to Administrative Justice in the United
States", p. 211, (1989)
11 President of the Federal Constitutional Court Prof. Dr.
Roman Herzog, "The Separation and Concentration of Power in
the Basic Law", 391,392, in: "Germany and its Basic Law",
ed. by P.KirchhofjD.Kommers, (1993)
U Justice Prof. Dr. P.Kirchhof, " Gegenwartsfragen an das
Grundgesetz", in: 44 Juristische Zeitung, 453,464 (1989)
9Because of this there is an own judicial branch that deals
only with administrative law which is quite necessary as
there are many different fields of administrative law.
Administrative law in Germany can be divided into two parts:
(1) the first part is the "general" administrative law that
regulates the forms of actions an agency may choose to
take, the procedures it has to obey by doing anything
with or towards a citizen as well as the general rules of
due process and fairness:
(2) the second part is called the "special" administrative
law and contains different subjects the different and
special administrative agencies are working with: this
can be police law, building law, municipal law,
immigration law and many more, in short: it contains all
public law (except for constitutional law) that occurs
between the citizens and the administrative and
regulative acting sovereign.
The "general" administrative law is federal law to ensure
fairness and equality in procedural rights for all citizens
in the same way, the "special" administrative law is enacted
by each of the 16 states, GG art 70 (1), and therefore it
may vary slightly from state to state.
To take legal action against an act/order of an
administrative agency there are three instances of
administrative courts. The first is the "ordinary"
administrative court of which there are several in each of
the states. The second instance is the higher administrative
10
court of which there usually is one in each state.13 The
court of the last resort is the Bundesverwaltungsgericht14
which's decision is final in matters of administrative law.
The decision is not final though, if it interferes with
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff then may try to defend him- or herself against the
decision of the F.A.C. before the Federal Constitutional
Court.
The plaintiff may sue before the F.C.C. if he/she fulfills
the formal requirements where he/she especially has to
signify in a plausible way that his/her constitutionally
guaranteed rights are harmed through the decision of the
Federal Administrative Court.
2) the rule of law
The "rule of law" whether seen as an abstract principle or
as an active-duty of the sovereign power is one of the (if
not the) main necessities of a democratic and just society
and political system. The means of guaranteeing the "rule of
law" may be different from country to country. But as a
backbone to ensure this rule of law a Constitution has to
13 some states have two; also the names may differ from
state to state: in some states the higher administrative
court is called "Verwaltungsgerichtshof", in some it is
called "Oberlandesgericht"
14 Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG), Federal
Administrative Court (F.A.C.), located in Berlin
11
either guarantee the possibility to obtain judicial review
of sovereign actions or it has to take care that the
"actors" of the sovereign power do not have the possibility
to act arbitrary without ensuring the possibility to obtain
jUdicial review for the concerned people.
a) "rule of law" in Germany
As mentioned above the first and main purpose of the german
legal system is not necessarily to obey the people's will
but to guarantee and rely on a just legal system. Because of
this the "fathers" of the constitution did not invent some
democratic "instruments" like e.g. the referendum but
instead of that just relied on the representative democracy.
This is one of the main lessons the Germans and the
"fathers" of the constitution learned from history.15 Though
it is sad if a country receives a good constitution very
late - there nevertheless is the good thing about it that
the "fathers" of the constitution have had'the possibility
to think about lessons and conflicts learned from earlier
constitutions in Germany, from constitutions in other
countries and from the history as well as from social and
cultural development.
15 see: K. stern, "General Assessment of the Basic Law - A
German View",17,19, in: "Germany and its Basic Law" ed. by
P.Kirchhof/D.Kommers (1993); history has shown that
"people's will" is not necessarily consistent with prior
"wishes" and that referendum's can be "directed" in aspecial direction
12
And though the german constitution was amended 40 times the
"fathers" of the constitution had learned their lesson from
history well and embodied the important requirements and
guidelines for a free democratic country obeying the rule of
law in the constitution without the possibility to ever
change them.u
The rule of law (or at least its main expression) is written
down in GG art 20 (3)17: "The legislator has to obey the
constitutional order, the executive and judiciary shall be
bound by law and justice".
Combined with the impossibility to ever change this article
of the constitution - GG art. 79 (3) - this is the biggest
guarantee in favor of the rule of law. Nevertheless there
are several other articles of the constitution that embody
the rule of law.
The F.C.C. always tried to avoid fixing itself on a certain
point of view whether the principle of the rule of law was
16 GG art. 79 (3): the most important articles of the
Constitution can never ever be changed (the so called
"eternity - article"); this was one, if not the biggest
mistake of the Constitution of the Weimarer Republic (1919-
1933) that otherwise obeyed the principle of the rule of
law; see: E.Schmidt-Assmann, supra note 2, 987,996
17 though most of the scholars believe that the principle
of the rule of law is embodied in GG art. 20 (3) - some
scholars believe that this principle is written down in GG
articles 28 (1), 20 (1), see: E.Schmidt-Assmann, supra
note 2, pp.987,989; see also: President of the Federal
Constitutional Court Roman Herzog, "Kommentar zu
Art. 20 GG, (II Abschnitt)", pp.20-26, in: Maunz/Duerig,
"Kommentar zum Grundgesetz", (1993)
13
embodied in GG art 20 (3) or in GG art 28 (1) but instead of
that in its decisions the Court spoke about the rule of law
as a general principle of the constitution.18
The Federal Constitutional Court said that this principle
was not enacted in a few written sentences but that it
rather is a combination of many principles and ideals
reflected in the whole established system, organization and
purpose of the Grundgesetz. 19
b) rule of law in the United states
In the U.S. the rule of law is not explicitly enacted in the
Constitution. Certain features of course are secured in the
Constitution like e.g. the separation of powers" due process
of law, the assurance of certain fundamental human rights
and through the whole structure of the Constitution the
guarantee of a "dichotomy between general rule of law and
personal discretion to do justice"20 is promised.
Reasons for not explicitly mentioning the rule of law may be
(a) that the "framers" of the Constitution held the
principle of the rule of law as an obvious content of the
U K.Stern, supra, note 15, p.613
19 Judgement of July 1st 1953, Bundesverfassungsgericht,
1st senate, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
2,380,403, (later: BVerfGE 2,380,403)
20 see: Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice, "The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules", 56 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1175, (1989)
14
whole Constitution and that (b) there may be differences
between common law and civil law systems in the essential
understanding of what the rule of law really is.
The rule of law may be a "higher" law or a general principle
providing justice and judicial review of governmental
actions21 which is achieved through a variety of different
"instruments" like e.g. open findings, open precedents and
avoiding the unnecessary use of discretion.22
Rule of law in the U.S. means supremacy of law over
individual decisions23 which of course includes the law
enacted by Congress. 24
21 K.C.Davis, "Administrative Law Treatise", Vol. I,
pp. 97-117, (1978)
22 K.C. Davis, supra note 21, Vol.I, p.117
23 K.C. Davis, supra note 21, Vol. I, pp. 97 - 102
24 A plain distinction between the difference in the
meanings of the "rule of law" in the United Stated and
Germany is e.g. that in the U.S. the "due process of law" is
constitutional guaranteed only for cases where "life,
liberty or property" are at stake. In all other cases
judicial review either is guaranteed within the explicit
statute or it is not possible to obtain, see:
R.Pierce,Jr./S.Shapiro/p.verkuil, "Administrative Law and
Process", p. 124, 2nd ed., (1992); in Germany jUdicial
review can be obtained if a right/entitlement of the person
is violated whereby a right/entitlement can be given not
only by the Constitution but by every code whereby the
statute does not have to state that there is the possibility
to obtain jUdicial review
15
The rule of law requires that the agencies acting for the
sovereign power do not act arbitrary25 or can be controlled
concerning their legal decisions/actions. Not the abstrac~
rule of law is the main aim of the Constitution but to
ensure a "liberal" democracy with "equal protection of the
laws"u for every citizen.
B) Differences in Purpose and Aim of the Administrative
Agencies
1) administrative agencies in Germany
The administrative agencies in Germany exist to execute the
laws and the regulations.
structure and purpose of the administrative agencies aim to
accomplish the rule of law and therefore the administrative
agencies are a neutral sovereign - body (or branch)
executing the laws of the legislator.27 Bound to the law the
administrative agencies are dependent on the normative legal
25 see: K.C. Davis, supra note 21, Vol. I, p.104
26 U.S.Constitution 14th Amendment sec.1
27 see: Rudolf DOlzer, "Verwaltungsermessen und
Verwaltungskontrolle in den Vereinigten staaten",
in: "Die Oeffentliche Verwaltung", 578,579, (1982)
16
status.28 The legislator can influence the administrative
agencies insofar as agencies can be closed or that the
legislator can organize new agencies. The legislator may _
by doing this - attach importance to certain subjects that
it thinks are more important than other subjects. But first
of all most agencies that do exist in Germany can not be
closed29 and even if the legislator creates new agencies _
as they have to obey the rule of law they are working in an
objective and neutral way which can not be influenced by
certain political interests or "visions".
The executive branch has no influence at al130 especially
because the "fathers" of the Constitution made it possible
to create only a few federal agencies, GG art. 87 (3).3~
Most of the administrative agencies therefore are not
federal but county or city agencies. These administrative
agencies are not involved in the political process.
28 Ernst Forsthoff, "Lehrbuch des Verwal tungsrechts,
Allgemeiner Teil", p.14, 9th ed., (1966)
29 because they are needed to administrate the "daily
necessities"
30 except on very few agencies like e.g. the "Deutsche
Bundespost" (German postal service) where the head of the
"agency" is an executive secretary
31 dealing with the ability to create new agencies:
Judgement of February 28th 1961, 2nd senate,
BVerfGE 12,205,229
17
2) administrative agencies in the united states
In the United states the administrative agencies are very
close to the executive and are a part of the political
process.32 This is a necessity of art. II § 3 of the U.s.
Constitution which rules that the President "..•shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed ..• ". As the
administrative agencies execute the laws the President of
course has to have influence on the agencies because he is
the person who is responsible that the "... laws be
faithfully executed •••".
Though the administrative agencies do execute the laws they
have broad powers in "executing the laws". They have quasi _
legislative and quasi-judicial power.33 These quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial powers can be very broad. As
long as Congress enacts an "intelligible principle to which
the agency must conform ••.".34 the judicial branch will not
strike down the particular delegation.35 Congress often
delegates legislative powers quite broadly because Congress
defers to the specific knowledge of the agency.
~ R.Dolzer, supra note 27, 578,579
33 see: R.C. Davis, supra note 21, Vol. I, p.182
34 J.W.Hampton, Jr & Co V. United states,
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)
35 to the history of the nondelegation doctrine see:
M. Strobel, "Delegation and Individual Rights",
56 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1321,1322 (1983)
18
As an administrative agency may make "legislative"
decisions36 the jUdicial branch is restrained controlling
those decisions because it will not decide "legislative" or
political questions.
More than that the courts put more weight on verifying the
formal instead of the objective parts of an agency decision
because the administrative agency has special knowledge or
"technical expertise"" in the special topic they are
working with. 38
Though the administrative agencies have traditionally been a
part only of the executive branch Congress created
independent agencies because Congress wanted "agencies that
exercise judicial functions" to be independent39 and
~ the "intelligible principle" nevertheless allows
Congress to delegate a broad amount of authority; "Broad
delegations of power by Congress have been justified as
necessary to deal with the realities of modern Government",
see: M.Strobel, supra note 35, 1321,1328
37 Richard Nagareda, "Ex Parte Contacts and Institutional
Roles: Lessons from the OMB Experience", 55 U.Chi.L.Rev.591,593 (1988)
38 R. Dolzer, supra note 27, 578,580; Hans D. Jarass,
"Besonderheiten des amerikanischen Verwaltungsrechts im
Vergleich", in: "Die Oeffentliche Verwaltung", 377,378,(1985)
~ K.C.Davis, "Administrative Law and Government", p.17,(1975)
19
"freedom from the Presidential domination". 40 The question
that arose though was whether the "independent" agencies
were constitutional.41
The President's influence on these independent agencies is
diminished considerably as he may remove officers of those
independent agencies only for cause.42 This can be contrary
to the President's constitutional duty "to take care that
19
"freedom from the Presidential domination". 40 The question
that arose though was whether the "independent" agencies
were constitutional.41
The President's influence on these independent agencies is
diminished considerably as he may remove officers of those
independent agencies only for cause.42 This can be contrary
to the President's constitutional duty "to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed".
The Supreme Court so far held the existence of these
independent agencies nevertheless constitutional.43
The executive has broad powers as it controls the
administrative agencies but as the President executes the
laws which are made by Congress the separation of powers are
40 Mashaw/Merrill/Shane, "Administrative Law, The American
Public Law system", p.24, 3rd ed. (1992)
41 this may be questioned as "independence and separation
of powers are linked concepts", see: P.Verkuil, "Separation
of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence",
in: 30 Wm & M.L.Rev. 301,322, (1989); it therefore can be
difficult for the President to fulfill his constitutionally
demanded tasks
42 "The condition that makes the independent agencies truly
independent is a statutory restriction on removal for
cause", P.Verkuil, supra note 41, 301,330
43 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.
2d 569 (1988)
20
balanced. 44 Even though the President has great influence
on the agencies45 the organic acts of the agencies are made
by Congress.
44 see: G.Robinson, " Independent Agencies: Form and
Substance in Executive Prerogative", in: 1988 Duke L.J. 238,
243, (1988)
45 such as: "appointment of members, budgetary controls and
simple power of persuasion", G.Robinson, supra note 44,
p. 238,245
Part II
POSSIBILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM
1) jUdicial review of what kind of administrative actions?
a) no "numerus clausus"
In a civil law system rights and duties are written down in
codes. Because of this a problem may arise if a certain
right is needed (and though the existence/need of this right
may be generally accepted) this right nevertheless is not
available because it is not enacted in a code. This can be
an especially dangerous situation if there should be the
need to take legal action against a certain sovereign action
and no suitable lawsuit is available for the citizen in the
VwGO. This is quite uncomfortable as irretrievable
situations and facts may be established if there is not the
possibility to take legal action against the sovereign.
Though the legislator may enact restrictive presuppositions
for the admissibility of lawsuits46 it may not prohibit the
46 see: E.SChmidt-Assmann, "Kommentar zu Art. 19 (4) GG",
in: Maunz/Duerig "Kommentar zum Grundgesetz", p.127, (1993);
the federa~ legislator enacted the VwGO as "final" code for
procedural requirements so that the states may not establish
new procedural rules or requirements for the administrative
courts, GG art. 74 No 1; see: Judgement of February 17th
1981, 7th senate, BVerwGE 61,360,363
21
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possibility to obtain jUdicial review.47 To ensure the
possibility to take only certain legal actions would be the
same as to prohibit the possibility to obtain judicial
review in some circumstances. Because of this it is possible
to enact only certain lawsuits48 if there is the guarantee
that it is possible to obtain judicial review with other
legal actions than the enacted lawsuits whenever there
should be the need for it. Therefore there is no "numerus
clausus" of the possibilities of the lawsuits. If there
should be the need for legal protection and none of the
enacted lawsuits would really help to reach the required aim
there of course nevertheless is the possibility to sue.
b) action/inaction
As it is known that an inaction can cause the same damage as
an action can the legal action may be brought against agency
actions as well as inactions.
The agency may reject to act in a desired way or it may just
work very slowly so that after a certain period of time it
is unreasonable for the citizen to wait any longer.49 The
47 Judgement of April 15th 1980, 2nd senate,
BVerwGE 54,94,97
48 though the states may not create and enact new types of
lawsuits, Judgement of October 11th 1966, 1st senate,
BVerfGE 20,238,251
49 Walter Schmitt Glaeser, "Verwaltungsprozessrecht",
pp.172,179, 11th ed. 1992
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agency may act in a way the citizen does not want to endure
and which he/she does not have to endure.
The main question therefore is not whether the agency acted
or did not act but if the rights or legal entitlements of
the citizen are or have been restricted.
c) judicial review of all administrative actions?
The same is true concerning the possibility to review
different forms the agency choose to act or cases where the
agency did not want to act.
Whether the agency enacted an administrative act, order,
statute or just gave advice does not matter at all
(concerning the question if there is judicial review or if
there is not).
"The protection of the GG art 19 (4) is available no matter
what type of administrative action the administrative agency
choose".~
There are different lawsuits to take legal action against
the different types of action but after all those types of
actions are artificial and do only exist to serve a certain
purpose.
d) jUdicial review of discretionary decisions of the agency
Many statutes give the administrative agency discretion in
finding a decision after weighing the legal and factual
50 E.Schmidt-Assmann, supra note 46, p.41
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arguments and possibilities. The court of course may not
substitute its own opinions for those of the agency. The
discretionary decision of the agency nevertheless can be and
has to be controlled, at least to some extent.51
VwVfG § 40 rules that while the agency uses discretion it
has to use this in the sense of the respective law and the
agency may not infringe the legal limits of the discretion.
There are four types of mistakes an agency can make while
using its discretionary power and which can be controlled by
the court
* if an agency makes a decision based on facts that do not
* if an agency makes a decision thinking that there are
certain limits of discretion whereas those limits do.not
exist in this concrete case53;
* if the decision of the agency was arbitrary54;
* if the agency does not really use its discretion and does
not put any weigh on the individual case but instead acts to
standardize its acts.
51 see: W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p.99
52 F.Kopp, "Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz", p.576 , 3rd ed.
(1983)
53 Judgement of February 3rd 1959, 2nd senate,
BVerfGE 9,137,147-149
54 Bundesverwaltungsgericht, Judgement of September 27th
1978, in: 32 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift pt 2, 1112,1113
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If the agency makes mistakes within those four categories
the court can find them out. Other decisions of the agency _
even though the agency could have made better decisions _
are within their discretionary power and not justiciable.
2) at what time can jUdicial review be obtained?
a) usually the agency has acted
Usually jUdicial review can only be obtained if an action of
the administrative agency already has happened because only
unless you know of a certain act or order you can react.
If a person receives an administrative act he/she has to
react within a certain period of time because there is only
a limited period of time in which a lawsuit can be brought
to a court, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung55, § 74 (1)(1 month).
To keep the administrative agency efficient and in order
there are certain time limits until when an action, a
complaint or a pretrial review (Vorverfahren) may be brought
for administrative review to the agency, VwGO sec. 68 (1).
This period of time only starts running the day the
addressee receives the administrative act or on the day it
was declared to him in his/her presence, not the day it was
released.
55 Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (VwGO), rules of the
administrative courts; Beck-Texte im dtv, 19th ed. November,1st 1993
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There are different circumstances possible though that may
require a court's decision or action before an
administrative act is released: (aa) it is possible that an
agency did not react within a certain period of time to a
certain request by a person, e.g. request for a building
permission, (VwGO sec. 75: 3 months); (bb) if there is the
plausible and foreseeable chance that the agency will act in
a certain way which will harm subjective rights of- a person
and (cc) there furthermore is the possibility that there is
the urgent need for a person to uphold a certain situation
or legal status before it is changed irretrievably by the
administrative agency.
to (aa): The lawsuit needed to take legal action if the
administrative agency did not act within 3 months - VwGO
sec. 75 - though requested is called Verpflichtungsklage
(action against a public authority to compel the
performance of an administrative act for one's benefit)
and will be discussed under d).
b) provisional jUdicial review
to (bb): There are different possibilities to take legal
actions in advance if there is the foreseeable and plausible
chance that the agency will act in a certain way. This
prevential judicial review is a constitutional demand and
necessity - deriving from GG art 19 (4). Not only to
guarantee the possibility to obtain jUdicial review but also
the efficiency of this judicial review is guaranteed through
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the Grundgesetz.56 Derived from GG art 19 (4) the right to
have an efficient judicial review became one of the
fundamental rights of the german constitution.57 Prevential
review is a necessity to assure an efficient protection by
the courts. 58
c) preventive jUdicial review
to (cc): Citizens must have the possibility to obtain
jUdicial review of certain actions that otherwise would
diminish a certain entitlement or legal right. This jUdicial
review in Germany is called provisional jUdicial review and
is a result of GG articles 19 (4), 20 (3). This kind of
judicial review is necessary to avoid even the possibility
that arbitrary decisions may establish an unwanted or unjust
legal status quo. Provisional jUdicial review is a mixture
of providing reliance in the legal system and control of the
executi ve branch. 59
56 Judgement of November 12th 1958, 2nd senate,
BVerfGE 8,274,326; Judgement of July 18th 1973, 1st senate,BVerfGE 35,382,400
57 Judgement of April 2nd 1969, 1st senate,
BVerfGE 37,67,77
58 Judgement of September 8th 1972, Bundesverwaltungs-
gericht, 4th senate, Entscheidungen des Bundes-
verwaltungsgerichts 40,323,326, (later: BVerwGE40,323.326)
59 see: E.Schmidt-Assmann, supra, note 2, 987,1030
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3) the judicial review
a) formless remedies
There are three possibilities to complain about certain
actions of the administrative agencies within the respective
agency. There is a remonstrance, a request for
administrative review as well as a request for
administrative review by a superior officer. In contrast to
legal remedies these three remedies/complaints do not lead
the claimant to a court and in most cases they are used to
protest against certain actions that do not have a legal
impact. But they can be taken prior or even at the same time
of obtaining judicial review against the same action.
These are "complaints" which are expressed by an individual
against a certain action of an administrative agency or
behavior of one or several of their
ministerial/administrative officers and these complaints
will be judged only by the administrative agency itself.
These complaints may be about a certain act of the
administrative agency, an unfriendly civil servant or the
wish to have a certain act or an agency officer controlled
by a superior officer.
Those "complaints" can be made by everybody who has been
addressed by the action or who has contacts with an
administrative agency without any time limits or other
formal requirements.
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They may be not as efficient as obtaining judicial review by
a court60 but they often are faster than a decision of a
court and are about complaints that may be not important
enough to go before a court. And even if a'complaint should
be denied there usually still is the chance to file a suit.
b) distinction between admissibility and success
The judge who judges a lawsuit is doing this in two steps:
first he/she examines whether the formal requirements are
fulfilled and then he/she judges on the merits.
The review of a lawsuit therefore is divided into two parts
and the review of the formal requirements can be as enduring
as the review on the merits, though usually it is not as
difficult and therefore does not take as long as the
verification of the controversial legal problems.
Without any doubt the main importance lies on the jUdicial
review of the legal problems but to avoid misuse of the
jUdicial branch - which would lead to serious disadvantages
for the whole society - the legislator has to enact certain
procedural requirements to ensure the ability of the
jUdicial branch working in an efficient way.
Thereby the legislator has to obey certain limits and
standards - esp. those required by GG art 19 (4) - but as
60 as this is still the agency deciding over complaints
made about officers or actions of the agency itself it is
clear that a conflict of interests may arise. Nevertheless
the establishment of these complaints was/is an expression
of confidence in certain principles
30
long as these procedural rules do not diminish
constitutional rights these procedural and sometimes even
other requirements have to be accepted6~ by the
citizens/plaintiffs as a legal demand in order to conserve
the functioning of the jUdicial branch.
c) action to rescind / Anfechtungsklage
When an administrative agency wants to regulate a certain
object or subject against or in favor of an individual or a
small group of persons - in most cases it will enact an
administrative act. This is a special way to act because an
administrative act is enacted towards an individual or a
small group (where the affected persons do not necessarily
have to know each other) 62 and therefore it is "personal"
but nevertheless this act is legally binding.
As the action to rescind /Anfechtungsklage - which is
enacted in VwGO § 42 (1) - is the proper way to sue an
administrative agency because of the enaqtment of an
administrative act this legal action probably is the most
often used remedy. The aim of the plaintiff that can be
reached with this remedy is to cancel the administrative
6~ Judgement of January 12th 1960, 1st senate,
BVerfGE 10,264: with this decision the BVerfG upheld a rule
demanding an advanced payment for court costs
62 a "small group" can be several people but not that many
as that they could not be individualized by certain
characteristics
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act. If a court finds that the administrative act is
unlawful it will declare this act void, VwGO § 113 (1).
aa) The act against which this lawsuit can be taken
necessarily must be an administrative act. There is a
definition in VwVfG § 35 that explicitly says what an
administrative act is. There especially have to be five
components: the act must be (1) a sovereign act of an (2)
administrative agency dealing with (3) public law to (4)
regulate an individual case that has an (5) external
affection.63
The action to rescind may also be taken against an invalid
administrative act64 because an administrative act has to be
fulfilled/obeyed unless a court declares it void or if it is
very evidently invalid. But as a false diagnosis of the
validity of the administrative act by the addressee is of
course the sole problem of the addressee it usually is
better to take legal action to make sure whether the act is
invalid or not.
bb) If the administrative act can be divided into several
parts and these different parts still make sense a plaintiff
may sue only against the part that he dislikes, VwGO sec.
113 (1). This is very useful if only one part of the act
63 see: F. Kopp, supra note 52, pp. 462 - 502; external in
the sense that something is ordered against the addressee
that other people not directly affected nevertheless do
notice (or at least: can notice)
64 F.Kopp, "Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung", p 176, 6th ed.1984
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incriminates the addressee while the rest of the act is
favoring his interests.
The court then will declare void only the part against which
the plaintiff sued while the rest of the act will be upheld
even if it should be unlawful. This is written down in VwGO
sec. 88 that rules that the court is bound to the claim of
the plaintiff.~
VwGO §§ 88,113 (1) explaines that if the plaintiff sued
against the complete administrative act the court will
declare only these parts of the administrative act void that
really are unlawful while the rest of the act will be
upheld. That clarilies that there is no use in suing against
an administrative act just because the plaintiff dislikes
it.
If the administrative act was changed or amended in the
(legally required) administrative pretrial review but the
plaintiff still wants to take legal action against the
administrative act - not the original but the act in the
form it received through this pretrial review will be
reviewed by the court, VwGO § 79.
cc) What is important is the fact that the execution of the
administrative act still must be possible or - vice versa:
the administrative act may not be settled/executed
~ F. Kopp, supra note 64
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irretrievable or canceled by the administrative agency66 at
the time the plaintiff starts legal proceedings.
If the administrative act is executed or settled - because
the plaintiff first obeyed the act and then went to court or
because the administrative act had to be executed because of
urgent and overweighing public interests, VwGO sec. 80 (2) -
but still can be reversed the action to rescind nevertheless
is the correct legal action.
As the plaintiff first has to take action in an
administrative pretrial review, VwGO sec. 68 (1), and this
may take some time there may be circumstances in which the
administrative act settled itself. To avoid this and to
protect the addressee of the administrative act VwGO
§§ 80,80a rule that while taking a pretrial review or a
legal action before a court this administrative act may not
be enforcedjimplemented.67
If the administrative act settled itself and actually
nothing has changed or is happening anymore there
nevertheless is the possibility to sue the administrative
agency because of a legal wrong they tried to enforce with
this act or just because this meanwhile settled act
implemented a certain negative status on the plaintiff of
66 see: W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p.90
67 except in those cases mentioned above where there is an
overweighing pUblic interest, VwGO sec. 80 (2)
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which he tries to get rid of. This legal action is called
Fortsetzungsfeststellungsklage (FFK).
dd) The plaintiff does not necessarily have to be the sole
addressee of the administrative act, he/she does not have to
be among the addressees at all. Instead of that it is
important that the plaintiff can show in a plausible way
that there is the very likely possibility that one or even
several of his subjective personal public rights have been
harmed.
The action to rescind is successful if the plaintiff has the
claimed legal subjective position/right and if this
right/position is harmed in an unlawful way through this
administrative act.
d) writ of mandamus / Verpflichtungsklage
The Verplichtungsklage is a legal action to condemn an
administrative agency to enact a desired administrative act
to which the plaintiff has to have a legal right, VwGO § 42
(1) 2nd alternative.
The aim of the lawsuit therefore is to enforce a certain
desired action from the administrative agency that is not
acting as it should.
There are two possibilities why this lawsuit may be used:
(1) the citizen may have applied for a certain
administrative act at the competent agency. When the citizen
applied and nevertheless the agency did not act within 3
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months, the citizen may use this lawsuit to enforce a
decision, VwGO § 75;
(2) a citizen may use this lawsuit to enforce a certain
administrative act from the agency if he/she had applied for
an administrative act but the agency refused to enact this
administrative act. The reasons why the agency did not want
to enact this administrative act are irrelevant for the
citizen concerning his/her right to take legal action
against the agency.
aa) Just as the Anfechtungsklage the Verpflichtungsklage can
only be used in cases concerning an administrative act. The
plaintiff must have the desire to receive an administrative
act, not just any action of the agency, VwGO § 42 (1).
bb) Before going to court the plaintiff has to have obtained
a pretrial review68 at the administrative agency without any
success, VwGO sec. 68 (1). If the administrative agency did
not act at all there is nothing against which the citizen
may complain (at the agency level).
cc) The plaintiff has to claim that his/her rights may be
harmad through the agency by not enacting the desired
administrative act. Furthermore the plaintiff has to prove
in a plausible way that he has a subjective pUblic right to
demand this certain desired administrative act from the
agency, VwGO § 42 (2). This public right must be harmed
68 if the agency refused to enact the administrative act as
explained above under (2)
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through either rejecting the application or through not
acting at all. The agency may enact a certain part of the
desired administrative act but may nevertheless refuse to
enact other parts.69 The plaintiff may sue against this
partial denial of his/her desire as well.
dd) The citizen must have applied /asked for the
administrative act at the competent and responsible
administrative agency because the administrative agency must
have the legitimate right and entitlement to enact an
administrative act respectively dealing with a topic the
citizen asked for.
ee) If the application to enact an administrative act was
rejected by the administrative agency the plaintiff has to
take legal action within 1 month since the day he received
notice of the rejection, VwGO § 74 (2).
ff) If the plaintiff wins the lawsuit the administrative
agency either will be condemned to enact a certain specified
act ("Spruchreife") or it may be condemned to enact an
administrative act regarding the legal opinion of the court
about a certain topic ("Bescheidungsurteil").
ff a) "Spruchreife": if the legal and factual assumptions
are fulfilled and no other requirements are needed to enact
this certain specified and required administrative act the
court will order the agency to enact explicitly this desired
act.
69 W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 175
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ff b) "Bescheidungsurteil": the court orders the
administrative agency to enact the required administrative
act whereby the agency has discretion in factual but not in
legal matters.
e) action for a declaratory judgement (Feststellungsklage)
As the name of this legal action already elucidates - people
using this lawsuit do not want to receive or reject a
certain action but instead of that want to have clarity
about a legal relationship, status or legal act.
VwGO § 43 that regulates the action for a declaratory
judgement lists two possibilities when this legal action can
be useful:
(1) the action for a declaratory judgement is the correct
legal action to ascertain the invalidity of an
administrative act. Different from the Anfechtungsklage that
aims at the declaration of the illegality of an
administrative act this administrative act has to be
declared invalid. An administrative act is invalid if e.g.
an agency enacted this act without beeing authorized by
statute to enact an administrative act like this.70 An
invalid administrative act has no legal authority or power
but as the act was enacted by an agency representing the
sovereign power this act may be - solely through the
possible appearance of legality - a burden for the
70 See: E.Forsthoff, supra note 28, pp. 219,220
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addressee. To free himself from this burden the citizen must
have the chance to let this act be declared invalid.
The invalid administrative act has no legal power at all
whereas in contrast to that the illegal administrative act
is illegal but has to be obeyed by the addressee unless a
court declares it void.
(2) The second possibility to use this legal action is to
ascertain the existence (positive) or non-existence
(negative) of a legal relationship, VwGO § 43 (1). This
legal relationship has to establish a concrete case between
at least two legal personalities based on public law.71
to (1): If the plaintiff wants to ascertain the invalidity
of an administrative act the act in question necessarily has
to be an administrative act within the meaning of the
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz § 35.72 The plaintiff must have
applied without success at the competent administrative
agency to have this administrative act declared invalid,
VWVfG § 44 (5).
If the plaintiff has had the chance to enforce his legal
rights with either the Verpflichtungsklage, Anfechtungsklage
or the allgemeine Leistungsklage he can not file an action
71 Judgement of November 28th 1975, 7th senate,
BVerwGE 50,11,19; Judgement of June 26th 1981, 4th senate,
BVerwGE 62,342,351
72 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (VwVfG); code of the
different possibilities an administrative agency may act
Beck -Texte im dtv, 19 th ed. November 1st 1993
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for declaratory judgement because this lawsuit is subsidiary
to the other legal actions, VwGO § 43 (2).
aa) A pretrial administrative review is not possible and
therefore not required.
bb) There is no time limit within which the lawsuit must be
brought before a court.
cc) The plaintiff has to have an entitled interest (not
necessarily a legal interest) in the decision and an
interest in an early decision of the court.73 The interest
affected may be of an economic, social or political
nature. 74
dd) The lawsuit is successful if the administrative act is
invalid as a matter of fact or if the asserted legal
relationship exists or does not exist (however the plaintiff
claimed the relationship to be).
f) Fortsetzungsfestellungsklage (FFK)
This lawsuit mentioned in VwGO § 113 (1) sentence 4 is used
against administrative acts that settled itself and
therefore do not exist anymore. The aim is to have
this respective administrative act declared illegal. The FFK
therefore is an exception to the general rule that there
n W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 200
74 VGH Baden Wuerttemberg, judgement of February 27th 1989,
in: 43 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (pt 1), 268 (1990)
(VGH, Verwaltungsgerichtshof, higher administrative court)
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has to be either an action or an inaction to sue against.
Though enacted to serve GG art 19 (4) the FFK more likely is
a result of GG art 20 (3) and the principle of the rule of
law. The sovereign power - enacting laws or acting through
administrative agencies - has to be controlled by the
judiciary and more than that the citizens must have the
right to restrain against the appearance that an enacted
administrative act was correct though it was not and
therefore did him/her a legal wrong. The sovereign has the
obligation to avoid possibilities in which a negative
appearance or an impression of unlawfulness is thrown upon a
citizen. When an administrative act (that orders the
addressee to do or not to do a certain thing) settles itself
there is always the danger that a certain negative
impression remains.
There are three possible cases in which the FFK can be used:
(1) If an administrative act settles itself after the
plaintiff filed a lawsuit but before a decision of the court
was made - the plaintiff then can either withdraw the
lawsuit or he can change the Anfechtungsklage subsequently
to a FFK.75 With this FFK the plaintiff aims to receive the
decision of the court that the - by now - settled
administrative act has been illegal.
75 Judgement of December 1st 1982, 7th senate,
BVerwGE 66,307
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(2) Another possibility to use the FFK is the case that an
administrative agency rejected to enact a desired
administrative act. Even if this desired administrative act
should not be necessary anymore (because e.g. the factual
situation changed) there still is the possibility to sue the
agency in some cases.
The aim of this FFK is the subsequent declaratory judgement
that the rejection to enact the desired administrative act
was illegal.~
(3) Analogous to VwGO 113 (1) sent. 4 the FFK is possible in
cases where the administrative act settled itself before the
plaintiff could take legal action with an
Anfechtungsklage.77
In this case no pretrial administrative review
(VwGO § 68 (1» is necessary if the administrative act
settled itself before the time limit to take this pretrial
review was over. If the administrative act settled itself
76 F.Kopp, supra note 64, p. 998; a case where this
subsequent declaratory judgement could be necessary is when
the owner of a property applied for a permission to build a
house on his property but this application was denied by the
competent agency. If the owner then wants to sell his
property it is of course less valuable than it would be
having the possibility to build a house. In this case the
owner has the urgent interest to let the refusing agency's
decision be declared illegal (if he really had the legal
entitlement to receive a building permission) so that more
people will be interested in buying this property because
they have the possibility to build a house; in this case the
owner has a respectable interest in a court's decision
77 W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 207; Judgement of
February 9th 1967, 1st senate, BVerwGE 26, 161,165
42
after the time limit was over but the plaintiff did not take
this pretrial review - the lawsuit will not be admissed.78
aa) To pass the admissibility examination the formal
requirements of the Anfechtungsklage have to be fulfilled.
bb) The administrative act must have settled itself after
the lawsuit was filed but before the court came to a
decision.~
cc) The plaintiff has to change80 the lawsuit from an
Anfechtungsklage to a FFK.
dd) Furthermore the plaintiff has to have a special interest
that the administrative act that settled itself should be
declared illegal. This interest can be of legal, economic,
political, religious or any other nature.81 A special
interest is e.g. if there is the danger that an
administrative act will be repeated.82
78 Judgement of February 9th 1967, 1st senate,
BVerwGE 26,161,167
79 this is necessary only in case (1)
~ only in case (1)
81 VGH Baden Wuerttemberg, Judgement of February 27th 1989,
in: 43 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, (pt 1) 268, (1990)
82 Judgement of September 3rd 1963, 1st senate,
BVerwGE 16,312,316
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g) action requesting a change of a legal right
There are several administrative law lawsuits that contain
topics dealing with civil law, too. These lawsuits are not
used very often but they nevertheless can be very important
and useful. 83
(1) There is the lawsuit to resumption of proceedings, VwGO
§ 153 in combination with ZPO § 57884, that aims to remove a
final administrative court decision because of eminent
procedural mistakes.~
(2) Another lawsuit is the petition for modification of
judgement, VwGO § 173 in combination with ZPO § 323, that
aims at the removal of a final administrative courts
decision. Reasons for this removal are changes in the state
of affairs or in the facts that lead the court to this
decision.86 The former decision was correct - based on the
facts that have been available at the time the decision was
made - but the facts available right now would lead to a
different result.
83 these lawsuits are not very important in the sense that
not very many people actually use them; of course this says
nothing about how important or useful they might be for the
people depending on them; trying to enlist all
administrative law remedies these should not miss here
84 Zivilprozessordnung, code of civil procedures
85 W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p.28
86 Othmar Jauernig, "Zivilprozessrecht", p.226, 22ed. 1988
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(3) Furthermore there is the possibility to bring an action
for avoidance of an arbitral award, VwGO § 173 in connection
with ZPO § 1043. In this case the removal of an arbitral
award can be demanded, ZPO § 1041, because of formal or
procedural mistakes.n
(4) The action raising an objection to the judgement claim
is written down in VwGO § 167 (1) in connection with ZPO
§ 767. This lawsuit is used to raise defenses against an
established claim88, e.g. defense of performance, waiver or
dath.
h) action for performance, Allgemeine Leistungsklage
This lawsuit is not explicitly written down in the VwGO but
it is derived out of the whole system of the VwGO,
especially keeping in mind the fact that there is no numerus
clausus of the types of lawsuits. The legal sources of the
action for performance are VwGO § 40 (1) and VwGO § 43 (2).
More than that this lawsuit can be seen as a result of GG
art 19 (4) in combination with VwGO § 40.89
This lawsuit is used to demand or to retrieve a certain act
of an administrative agency. It can be used to refrain from
n o. Jauernig, supra note 86, pp. 325/326,
88 see: Rosenberg/Schwab, "Zivilprozessrecht", p. 967, 13thed. 1981
89 W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p.213
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an administrative act, too. Very important is that the
demanded or prevented act may not be an administrative
act.~
aa) The desired or unwanted and prevented action of the
administrative agency has to be an act with legal relevance,
though it may not be an administrative act. It must be an
action of an agency concerning/dealing with an individual
case.U
bb) The plaintiff has to claim in a plausible way that his
subjective rights are hurt because of the administrative
agency's action/inaction, VwGO § 42 (2).
cc) A pretrial review is not necessary and there is no time
limit until when legal action has to be taken.
i) Klageart suis generis
Though it was planned92 to enact only certain types of
lawsuits the German Bundestag stood away from that
intention.
90 Judgement of February 25th 1969, 1st senate,BVerwGE 31,301
9~ Whether the act really must deal with an individual case
is controversial; in favor: VGH Hessen, Judgement of March
15th 1968, DVBL 1969, 504; against: VGH Bayern, Judgement of
December 12th 1980, BayVBL 1981, 499,503; the VGH Bayern is
of the opinion that even statutes can be a matter of dispute
with this lawsuit; citations from Schmitt Glaeser, supranote 49, p.215
92 Bundestags - Drucksachen 3/1955; cited from W. Schmitt
Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 223
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Taking this position the German Bundestag tried to avoid a
certain enumeration of types of lawsuits because they feared
that otherwise they would enact an immovable and not useful
legal system. 93
Therefore there is no numerus clausus of lawsuits today but
instead of that there is the possibility - derived out of GG
art 19 (4) and of VwGO § 40 - to take any legal action
before an administrative court if the matter of dispute is
one of public law.
For example there nowadays is a lawsuit called
"Kommunal verfassungsstrei t" (dispute between municipals )94
dealing with disputes of municipal law between counties or
cities. Though the existence of this lawsuit as an own type
still is controversial95 it shows the possibility to take
legal action without using one of the statutorily enacted
types of lawsuits.
93 keeping in mind that the German legal system relies on
statutes what means that these statutes have to be broad and
abstract to serve their purpose; though the legislator
enacted nearly all possibilities to take legal action they
kept in mind that the principle of the rule of law demandsmore than that.
94 first named this way by the OVG Lueneburg, DOEV
1961,548; cited from W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49,p. 224
95 W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 224
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j) Normenkontrollverfahren, VwGO § 47
This lawsuit is a mixture of a constitutional and
administrative law remedy.
As the name already points out it is used to control
regulations on a level below federal or state laws.
The Federal Constitutional Court controls federal and state
laws and their compatibility with the constitution, GG
articles 93 (1) No 2, 100 (1).%
VwGO § 47 gives the higher administrative courts - VGH,OVG _
the right to declare void regulations (a) enacted because of
BauGB § 246 (2)97, VwGO § 47 (1) no 1 and (b) other
regulations enacted by states (though not state laws) if the
state enacted laws that declare it possible to take this
legal action, VwGO § 47 (1) No 2.98
Important is that this judicial review can only be obtained
against regulations below formal state law.
96 The Federal Constitutional Court is the only Court in
Germany that can declare laws void, see: BVerfGG § 32 (2)
97 BauGB = Baugesetzbuch, code concerned with building law
98 the federal government can not order the states to enact
this kind of law dealing with state regulations; there is
not the obligation of the federal or the state governments
deriving from GG art. 19 (4) to give the opportunity to have
this kind of judicial review because even if there would not
be the chance to take legal action against a regulation
there still is the possibility to take legal action against
an act that was enacted because of this regulation, see:
F. Kopp, supra note 64, p.342
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aa) The decision about compliance with legislative law or
the damage of an individual's subjective rights can only be
issued by a higher administrative court (VGH/OVG).
bb) There has to be a petition aiming at the declaration of
invalidity of a certain norm.
cc) Everybody has the right to file such a petition if
he/she received or will receive (VwGO § 47 (2)) a
disadvantage because of this regulation. Not only
individuals but also every agency can file a petition to
control a regulation.
Though it is controversial what a disadvantage in this sense
is meant to be there is unity in the opinions concerning the
fact that this must be a legally protected interest.99
Some are of the opinion that the possibility that factual or
economic interests may be damaged are disadvantages within
the meaning of VwGO § 47 (2), too.100
dd) There is no pretrial review and there is no time limit
to sue.
k) provisional judicial review
In a legal system where the rule of law is the main
principle and aim there has to be the possibility to obtain
99 Judgement of July 14th 1978, 7th senate,
BVerwGE 56,172,175
100 VGH Baden Wuerttemberg, Judgement of February 2nd 1977,
in: 30 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1977, (pt 3), 1212
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judicial review prior to the execution of an action of an
administrative agency. This is necessary to avoid the
possibility that arbitrary or unjust actions may establish
an unwanted and unjust legal status quo.
Because this provisional judicial review has to be well -
timed and fast to be effective there only can be a summary
examination101 before the court makes a decision. But as this
is "only" provisional review to protect a certain status quo
and not a final decision - even if the provisional decision
should be wrong it can and will be changed in the court's
final decision.
The main essence about provisional review is not the fact
that it is provisional but that it is fast and well _
timed. 102
The provisional review reverses the "assumption of the
legality" of the action of the sovereign into its contrary103
and it remains like this until the final decision is issued.
aa) If a person wants to take legal action against an
administrative act he/she has to enforce his/her rights with
an Anfechtungsklage where there is the legal requirement to
obtain a pretrial administrative review, VwGO § 68 (1).
101 K.Finkelnburg/K.Jank, "Vorlaeufiger Rechtsschutz im
Verwaltungsstreitverfahren",p.2/3, 3rd ed. 1986
102 "Only well - timed jUdicial review is just jUdicial
review", P. Kirchhof, supra note 12, 453, 464
103 W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p.149
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While obtaining the pretrial review or while taking legal
action with an Anfechtungsklage the VwGO §§ 80,80a rule that
the administrative act can not be executed unless a final
decision has been made by the court concerning the
legality/illegality of this administrative act.
The execution of the administrative act is stopped even if
it may be addressed to several persons or if many people are
affected but only one takes legal action, VwGO § 80a.
Because the pretrial review and the Anfechtungsklage have to
be taken after the enactment of the administrative act the
prohibition to execute the administrative act is retroactive
to the time the act was enacted. 104 The agency that executes
an administrative act before the time limit to take legal
actions has passed acts at its own risk. 105
This means that if the citizen takes legal actions within
the time limit but after the agency executed the act the
agency has to reverse the execution of the administrative
act. 106
There are some exceptions though from the fact that the
administrative act may not be executed before the time limit
(VwGO §§ 70 (1), 74 (1): 1 month) is over:
104 W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 48, p.153
105 Judgement of October 11th 1967, 5th senate,
BVerwGE 28,63,65
106 W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 155
51
(1) VwGO § 80 (2) No 1: if a pUblic authority demands taxes
the agency may execute the administrative act ordering the
citizen to pay the taxes;
(2) VwGO § 80 (2) No 2: important and urgent orders of the
pOlice may be executed immediately;
(3) VwGO § 80 (2) No 3: in oases where the immediate
execution is ordered by explicit federal law;
(4) VwGO § 80 (2) No 4: in cases where the immediate
execution is favored by public interests or by outweighing
interests of one of the participants.
The agency is legally required to submit a written statement
why an immediate execution is necessary. If the agency does
not submit this statement the execution was illegal. The
execution of the administrative act is illegal, too, if the
reasons the agency stated were not based upon important
"overweighing" public interests .107
bb) The plaintiff has to apply for provisional judicial
review by the competent administrative court in the case of
VwGO § 123. With this provisional review the plaintiff wants
the court to force the administrative agency to give him/her
a certain legal position/advantage. There is the possibility
to receive a provisional decision if there is the danger
that a legal position may be changed irretrievable or that
107 this is very important because otherwise the provisional
review would be enacted in the VwGO but not enforceable,
reliable and effective
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the enforcement of a legal position/right would be much more
difficult, VwGO 123 (1) sentence 1.
VwGO § 123 (1) sentence 2 states that there also can be a
provisional decision if there is a controversial legal
relationship between an agency and one (or more) citizen
that may change. When this change would harm one of the
participants if the court would not act immediately a
provisional judicial decision should be made.
cc) Even in the Normenkontrollverfahren the higher
administrative court can make a provisional decision if it
should be necessary.
Different from the other cases where provisional review is
available in this case the plaintiff tries to end the
execution of a legal norm which affects many people.
Because of this a high standard concerning the affected
interests is required to release a provisional judicial
decision concerning a regulation.
The plaintiff has to state in a plausible way that there are
very important reasons to receive this provisional decision
or that this provisional decision is the only way to avoid
severe disadvantages. 1.08
The court will release a provisional review on behalf of
VwGO § 47 (8) only if it is of the opinion that to stop the
execution of the regulation has to be required imperatively
because otherwise severe damages would occur.
1.08 Finkelnburg/Jank, supra note 101, pp. 156/157
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1) preventive judicial review
The preventive judicial review is a necessity of
GG art 19 (4): "Legal protection is not efficient if the
jUdicial review is confronted with a fait accompli" .1.09
GG art 19 (4) "orders" preventive jUdicial review in some
cases.l.l.0There is the problem though that a preventive
decision of a court interferes with other branches while
they still are in the process of finding a decision. Because
of this the preventive judicial review should not be one of
the "standard" jUdicial reviews made possible through
GG art 19 (4). Therefore the plaintiff of the preventive
jUdicial review has to proof a special legitimation to use
this legal action. 1.1.1.
The necessity to have a special legitimation is realized in
the way that the plaintiff has to have a "special need" for
legal protection. This special need for legal protection is
missing if it can be expected that the plaintiff obtains the
"usual" judicial review after the agency acted.1.1.2The
"special need" for legal protection has to be much more
1.09E.SChmidt-Assmann, supra note 46, p. 152
1.10Judgement of July 20th 1962, 7th senate,
BVerwGE 14,323,328
1.1.1.E.Schmidt-Assmann, supra note 46, p. 153
1.1.2Judgement of September 8th 1972, 4th senate,
BVerwGE 40,323,326
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intense than the usual "general need" for legal
protection.u3
aa) with the preventive Feststellungsklage the plaintiff
wants the court to forbid the agency to act in a certain
way.U4 This action may be an administrative act or any other
form the agency chooses to take. As this is preventive
review the agency so far did not act but it is "obvious"
that it will act in a certain way. Not the fact that it is
"obvious" that the agency will act is the most important
issue concerning this legal action but to avoid the
possibility that an irretrievable situation may be
established is the main concern. It can be "obvious" that
the agency will act if e.g. the agency acted like this
before in corresponding situations.
The plaintiff has to have a special and qualified interest
in a legal protection of his rights. Reasons for that are
e.g. the irretrievable execution of the administrative act
or the irretrievable consolidation of a certain situation or
legal status quo if the administrative act was enacted or if
the agency would act in the expected way.
bb) The preventive unterlassungsklage aims to prohibit the
agency to enact a certain administrative act. This lawsuit
is almost the same as the preventive Feststellungsklage with
113discussed later under D) h)
114W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 209
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the difference that the preventive Feststellungsklage can be
used against any administrative agency action whereas the
preventive Unterlassungsklage can be used only against
administrative acts.
Because of this the preventive Feststellungsklage can be
sUbsidiary to the preventive Unterlassungsklage in cases
dealing with administrative acts.us
cc) The third possibility to use the preventive jUdicial
review is the preventive allgemeine Leistungs -
Unterlassungsklage.
This lawsuit serves two purposes: (1) when an administrative
agency already acted in an illegal way and the plaintiff now
tries to prevent the agency from acting the same way in the
future and (2) when it is certain that the administrative
agency will act and the plaintiff tries to prevent this.H6
Important is the plausible danger of reiterationu7 or
special reasons that justify not to wait for the
administrative action.H8
1.15 Judgement of May 7th 1987, 3rd senate,
BVerwGE 77, 207,211
116 this prevential jUdicial review has the same aim as the
preventive Feststellungsklage, supra aa)
11.7 Judgement of February 8th 1974, 7th senate,
BVerwGE 44, 351
118 Judgement of April 18th 1985, 3rd senate,
BVerwGE 71, 183,188
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4) admissibility of these lawsuits
The requirements for the recourse to the courts may differ a
little bit from lawsuit to lawsuit. The requirements that
are explained and described in this part are the main
requirements that are needed for all lawsuits.
a) admissibility of the recourse
VwGO § 40 gives recourse to the administrative courts in all
disputes concerning public law unless the dispute is ordered
to a different court by federal law. The dispute has to be a
matter of administrative law and may not be constitutional
law. Plaintiffs often claim that constitutional rights are
hurt through the administrative action. Object of the legal
action though is the administrative action and its
correspondence with its legal basis. Constitutional law in
the sense of VwGO § 40 are constitutional claims between the
government and the states or the Bundestag and the executive
or members of the executive concerning disputes over
constitutional rights and privileges of the respective
"constitutional organ".
The purpose of VwGO § 40 is to define the administrative
legal recourse and to show the difference to other legal
recourses (especially to the constitutional).u9
119 W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 34
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The administrative court has to examine whether the recourse
to the administrative court really is available in the
respective case. If the court finds that the case is not
mainly concerned with administrative law it has to dismiss
the case .120 The plaintiff (respectively his/her lawyer) has
to take care that the competent court deals with the lawsuit
because otherwise the time - limit to sue (VwGO § 74) might
be over.
b) infringement of a subjective right
In the german legal system the law can be divided into two
different kinds of law: one type of law is enacted to rule,
to regulate society and to establish order .121 The other type
of law gives persons who are addressed by this certain
statute legal rights. With this subjecti ve122 public right
the individual can demand a special action/inaction from the
administrative agencies and from the sovereign in general.
VwGO § 42 (2) rules that a lawsuit is admitted only if the
120 F. Kopp, supra note 64, p. 101
121 these laws are not enacted to protect or favor a certain
interest but e.g. to regulate administrative procedures or
to specify the different traffic signs
122 called this way because this law was enacted to serve
individuals/subjects. This right is not necessarily given to
everybody but in most cases it protects certain groups, e.g.
students, farmers, tenants; to establish this protection
rights are given to these groups on which they can rely
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plaintiff states in a plausible way that his/her rights are
harmed through the action of the agency. 123
During the admissibility the plaintiff does not have to
prove that his/her rights are harmed but he/she has to state
facts which make this violation very possible. 124
The court may not examine whether the plaintiff really has
the claimed subjective right or whether this legal right was
hurt because these are questions concerning the success of
the lawsuit.125
c) pretrial review, VwGO § 68 (1)
The pretrial review is a review of an administrative act by
the agency that enacted this act. Furthermore this pretrial
review is necessary if a citizen applied for a certain
123 to receive e.g. a building permission certain formal
requirements have to be fulfilled. But if these requirements
are fulfilled the person has a legal right to receive the
desired building permission. With fulfilling the
requirements this person is an addressee of the SUbjective
right given in this statute. If the agency nevertheless
rejects to give this building permission his/her subjective
right is violated. This elucidates the fact that a person
can come in the favor of a SUbjective right if certain legal
or factual requirements apply to that person; instructive to
the necessity of the violation of the SUbjective right for
the admissibility: Judgement of June 25th 1969, 4th senate,
BVerwGE 32,222,223
124 Judgement of October 29th 1963, 4th senate,
BVerwGE 17, 87,91; this can be a dubious system because
there of course is always the danger that while examlnlng
the plausible possibility of the infringement of the
subjective right the courts decision may be anticipated
125 W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 94
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administrative act but this request was rejected by the
agency. The citizen then has to obtain a pretrial review
against this rejection before taking legal action before a
court. However, if the agency did not act within three
months the citizen may take legal action before a court
without waiting for an agency answer or decision, VwGO § 75.
The pretrial review serves many purposes: the citizen can
obtain the pretrial review by himself without a lawyer and
without going to court, the administrative agency has the
possibility to review and control its own actions and the
administrative courts can concentrate on the claims that did
not settle themselves at the agency's review.
This pretrial review is necessary and mandatory before
taking legal action with an Anfechtungsklage or a
Verpflichtungsklage, VwGO § 68 (1).
If the plaintiff did not take a pretrial review before
taking legal action the judge has to suspend the trial.126
A pretrial review is not necessary if the administrative act
was enacted by one of the highest federal or state agencies,
VwGO § 68 (1) No 1, or if a third person is incriminated
with the agency decision for the first time127 he/she does
U6 F. Kopp, supra note 64, p. 570
127 if e.g. one person receives an administrative act
against which this person takes a pretrial review; if the
decision of the agency then incriminates a third person this
person is incriminated for the first time
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not have to start a pretrial review before taking legal
action, VwGO § 68 (1) No 2.
The citizen has to take the pretrial review within one month
after the administrative act was enacted or his/her request
was rejected, VwGO § 68.
The citizen has the right and the duty to obtain this
pretrial review. He/she furthermore has an entitlement to
receive an agency decision. The citizen has to obtain this
pretrial review without any procedural mistakes whereas
mistakes of the agency do not matter because with fulfilling
the formal requirements the citizen did all that is
necessary to receive the legal protection that is available
with this claim. 128
The pretrial review has to be applied for within one month
after the announcement of the administrative act at the
agency that enacted the act, VwGO § 70 (1) sentence 1.
This time limit will not start running though if the agency
did not send legal instructions with the administrative act,
VwGO § 58 (1). If the agency did not send these legal
instructions this is a failure of the agency129 which may not
burden the citizen if he/she does not react in the required
1U F. Kopp, supra note 64, p. 562; if procedural mistakes of
the agency could possibly diminish the citizens rights the
whole system would be superfluous
129the "normal" agency is not required by law to send legal
instructions, see: W.Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 118;
only a federal agency has to submit a legal instruction by
law, VwGO § 59
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time.1.3OTherefore the addressee has one year to take legal
action, VwGO § 58 (1), if these legal instructions are not
send to him/her.
The pretrial review has a provisional effect in the sense
that the agency may not execute the administrative act while
the citizen is obtaining this pretrial review,
VwGO § 80 (1) .131.
The administrative agency will remedy the act if it thinks
the act was either illegal or not suitable, VwGO § 72. If
the agency thinks the act is correct it will not change the
original act. The administrative act with the content it
received through this decision1.32will be object of the
lawsuit, VwGO § 79 (1) No 1.
A quite controversial question is whether the agency may
enact a flreformatio in peius" .133This possibility of an
administrative agency to release a reformatio in peius
1.30there is a reason for the fact that these legal
instructions should be send to the addressee: most of the
citizens will not know how to react in the legally required
and correct way because these procedural requirements can be
very complicated; for relevance of mistakes of the agency
see: W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p.117
131as explained supra under the possibilities of the
provisional review
1.32the administrative act may have been changed by the
agency
1.33in favor: Judgement of April 22nd 1971, 8th senate,
BVerwGE 38,60,65; lat.: reviewing the action and making it
"even worse"
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nowadays is accepted in general. 134The existence of the
reformatio in peius was controversial especially because the
VwGO does not mention anything in favor or against it.13sAs
every legally relevant action of an agency has to have a
legal foundation - basis for the reformatio in peius
therefore is the "special" administrative law with which the
respective pretrial is dealing.136
d) VwGO § 74
Only the Anfechtungsklage, the FFKand the
Verpflichtungsklage require that the citizen takes the legal
action within a certain period of time, VwGO § 68 (1).137
This is necessary because these lawsuits are concerned with
legally relevant orders of an agency that have to be obeyed
by the addressee. Of course the addressee has to have legal
protection against other burdens of the agency, too, like
134see: W.Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 126
135what of course does not astonish keeping in mind that
the VwGO is a federal code and the federal legislator does
not have the right to enact rules for the administrative
procedures of the states, GG art. 74 No.4; worth reading the
whole problem and a legally correct and evident solution:
Judgement of November 12th 1976, 4th senate,
BVerwGE 51, 310,313
136see: Judgement of November 12th 1976, 4th senate,
BVerwGE 51,310,314; if the agency made a discretionary
decision it can reverse its decision and make a new one
137F.Kopp, supra note 63, p. 624
63
e.g. the provisional jUdicial review that makes the
execution of the administrative act impossible.
The addressee has one month to react against the act of the
agency. During this month the agency may not enforce the
administrative act.138 If the citizen does not react within
this period of time though, the reliance in the proper
administration overweighs and the citizen will have no
remedies anymore.
other administrative actions/inactions usually are not
legally binding like the administrative act is so the
addressee of these actions does not necessarily has to react
within a certain period of time.1~
The time limit to sue can be one year instead of one month
if the administrative agency did not send legal instructions
with the administrative act, VwGO § 58 (1).140
138the agency can enforce the administrative act but when a
court declares the act illegal the agency has to reverse the
enforcement
139Persons usually can react whenever they want though they
have to take care (a) to avoid an irretrievable state and
(b) to avoid the situation that they may forfeit a legal
action. This might happen if the citizen does not respond to
an action of the agency and thereby establishes the general
conviction that he/she accepts the action. With this he/she
builds up reliance in his inaction/acceptance that he/she
lateron may not abuse.
140though it is not legally required to give legal
instructions (except if a federal agency was acting, VwGO
§ 59) it is a necessity of "real life" because most people
will not know how to react, see supra c)
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e) general need for legal protection
Though the "general need for legal protection" is not
mentioned explicitly in the VwGO there is no doubt about the
fact that the plaintiff has to have this need for legal
protection .141.
Because an explicit statutory basis is missing there are
difficulties to explicitly determine why this general need
for legal protection is necessary. Most scholars believe
that this necessity is a fundamental requirement to avoid an
abuse of the jUdicial branch.142 The "need for legal
protection" is mentioned in VwGO §§ 43, 113 (1), sentence 4
though which means that the plaintiff143 has to state his
need for legal protection. Regarding the other lawsuits
there is the belief that unless evident facts show the
contrary there is a general need for legal protection
because "abuse" of the jUdicial branch "is the exception".144
Usually there is the common belief that always when the law
gives a right/entitlement to a person and this person wants
141.Judgement of October 19th 1982, 1st senate,
BVerfGE 61,126,135
142W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 75
143in the Verpflichtungsklage and the Fortsetzungs-
Feststellungsklage (FFK)
144Judgement of January 17th 1989, 9th senate,
BVerwGE 81,164,165
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to protect his/her right/entitlement he/she has a generally
accepted need for protection.
5) when are these lawsuits successful?
a) correct claimant and the right defendant
After the formal and procedural requirements of the
respective lawsuits have been examined and accepted by the
judge the question then is whether the claim of the
plaintiff is legally justified. This part is concerned with
the question if the correct claimant sued the correct
defendant, if the claimant really has the claimed subjective
right/entitlement and whether this right or entitlement is
hurt in an inadmissible manner through an action/inaction of
the agency.
(a) The question whether the plaintiff is the correct
claimant is probably the most interesting part of the
lawsuit. In this part the judge has to examine if the
plaintiff really has the claimed Subjective
right/entitlement.us
145 in the admissibility the plaintiff had to assert that
there is the plausible possibility that his/her rights have
been harmed and though this plausible statement will prove
to be true in all probability (because the judge examined
earlier if this statement really is plausible) hiS/her claim
to a certain sUbjective right/entitlement nevertheless has
to be examined and proved to be true
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The rightful claimant is always the person that really has
the stated subjective right/entitlement ..1.46 Whether the
person has the claimed legal right depends on two things:
(i) if the claimed right can be a subjective right and (ii)
whether this subjective right addresses the claimant. The
jUdge examines the legal requirements and the facts and will
find out whether the plaintiff really has the claimed
subjective right. Though the other requirements are a little
bit different the plaintiff who takes legal action with a
Normenkontrollantrag , VwGO § 47, is the right claimant if
he/she fulfills the in the VwGO § 42 (2) entitled
requirements which means that he/she has to have had a
disadvantage because of this regulation or that he/she soon
will experience a disadvantage.147
As the declaratory judgement of the Feststellungsklage aims
at the declaration that a certain legal relationship exists
or does not exist this is not a question concerning the fact
if a subjective right exists or does not exist. Rather the
plaintiff has to have an entitled interest to receive a
declaratory judgement.1"
146 except in the Feststellungsklage and the
Normenkontrollverfahren
147 F. Kopp, supra note 64, p. 353
148 this entitled interest is already examined in the
admissibility of the Feststellungsklage
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The defendant is the agenoy with which the legal
relationship is claimed to exist or is claimed not to
exist. 149
(b) As administrative law deals with the relationship
between the sovereign power and the citizen, VwGO § 78 (1)
rules that the right defendant is the federal or state
government or the agency that enacted or rejected the
administrative act. If a special council of an
administrative agency acted this council is the right
claimant if the respective state law rules this,
VwGO § 78 (2) No 2.
b) unlawful agency action?
The examination whether the correct claimant sued the
administrative agency shows if the plaintiff really has the
subjective right/legal entitlement he/she claims to have and
claims to be hurt in through the agency action.
The second question then is whether the action of the agency
is lawful or illegal.
The lawsuit of the plaintiff is successful if the action of
the agency is illegal and through this his/her subjective
rights are harmed, VwGO § 113 (1) sentence 1.
The action of the agency will be divided and examined in two
parts: (aa) The first part that will be examined is the
formal legitimacy of the administrative agency's action.
149 W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 201
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To establish reliance in the administrative agency
representing the sovereign power the agencies have to
observe certain formal and procedural requirements if they
act. This is necessary to establish certain formal
requirements applicable to everybody in the same way,
corresponding to the rule of law and to control the way the
agency found its decision. Formal requirements to be
observed enacting an administrative act are e.g.
- that the agency that acted was the local and factual
competent agency, VwVfG § 3;
- that the agency obeyed the necessary procedural
requirements, VwVfG § 37 (2)-(4);
- that the agency observes the necessity to give reasons for
its actions, VwVfG § 39150;
- if a federal agency enacts an administrative act it has to
give legal instructions, VwGO § 59;
- that the administrative act is announced to the correct
addressee, VwVfG §§ 41,43.
If the agency complies with all the required necessities the
action of the administrative agency was enacted in a formal
legitimate way and therefore this part of the act is legal.
(bb) The second part of the examination is the part that
deals with the question whether the action itself was legal
150 this is legally required at least for the enactment
of an administrative act, see: W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra
note 49, p. 143; if the agency does not act in a legally
relevant way there is not necessarily the duty to give
reasons for the action
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or illegal. First of all there has to be a law that serves
as the "legal foundation" and basis and which allows the
agency to enact administrative acts in this topic. An agency
can only enact an administrative act legally if there is a
law that allows the agency to act in this certain way. This
can either be a law that regulates the general possibility
for the agency to act concerning a certain topic or it can
be a special law which gives the agency the right to act in
a certain way on a certain occasion. 151 The enacted act of
the agency has to comply with the legal contents of its
"legal foundation".
Furthermore general legal requirements have to be obeyed
like e.g. the administrative act has to be specific
regarding its content and the proportionality between aim,
purpose and the used methods has to be weighed in the
correct way. 152
If the agency used discretion it has to use this discretion
without abusing its power, VwVfG § 40.
Finally the administrative act has to be compatible with
"higher" law such as federal and state laws and regulations.
Probably the most important and difficult task is the
question whether the agency weighed the different interests
1M see: F.Kopp, supra note 52, p.506
152 W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 143
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at stake - those of the individual and those of the
administrative agency - in the correct manner.
But if all these requirements are fulfilled and therefore
the administrative act is legitimate not only in the formal
but also in the objective part the administrative act is
lawful.
If the administrative act is lawful the lawsuit is without
success.
(cc) If the agency made a mistake in either the formal or in
the substantive part the administrative act is illegal. As
the existence of a subjective right was examined earlier
this sUbjective right has to be injured through the
illegality of the administrative act. If the subjective
right of the plaintiff is not hurt through the illegal
administrative act - the lawsuit is not successful.~53
c) unlawful agency inaction?
If the plaintiff wants the agency to act in a certain way
but the agency rejects to act or does not act within three
months the question the judge has to examine is if the
~53The court may declare the administrative act illegal but
nevertheless the lawsuit is not successful if the subjective
rights of the plaintiff are not violated. This is important
for the costs because in Germany the party that looses the
lawsuit pays everything, the opponent's lawyer and the
court's costs. In cases dealing with social welfare and
veteran's benefits the plaintiff does not have to pay the
costs of the court, VwGO § 187
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plaintiff has a legal entitlement to demand this desired
action.
The judge therefore has to examine if the statement of the
plaintiff (that he/she has a legal entitlement to the
desired action) corresponds with the legal reality.
If the judge finds that the statement of the plaintiff does
not correspond with the legal facts the lawsuit will be
dismissed. If the judge finds that it does correspond with
the legal reality there are two possibilities how the
court's decision can be depending on the legal
requirements/possibilities for the administrative action.
(aa) The examination of the subjective right proved that the
plaintiff has a legal entitlement to demand a certain
administrative action/act. His/her entitlement respectively
his/her subjective right has been hurt by the inaction of
the agency but it will be violated furthermore if the court
will not order the agency to act. The court will find a
decision called Spruchreife if all legal and factual
assumptions which have been claimed by the plaintiff are
exactly the way he/she claimed them to be. If all these
factual and legal requirements to enact the desired
administrative act are present and the agency therefore has
no discretion the court will order the administrative agency
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to enact exactly the desired administrative act,
VwGO § 113 (5) sentence 1.154
(bb) If the examination of the presence of a legal
entitlement/subjective right of the plaintiff showed that
he/she has such an entitlement/right the court will order
the agency to act. Though the factual and legal necessities
to enact the desired administrative act are present - making
"only" a Bescheidungsurteil means that the agency still has
discretion, VwGO § 113 (5) sentence 2. with a
Bescheidungsurteil the agency will be ordered to enact an
administrative act but it still has discretion in choosing
the explicit content of the desired administrative act.
The court can not substitute its own opinion for that of the
agency. The discretion of the agency may concern all kinds
of matters but not the legally required necessity to act.155
Important concerning a Bescheidungsurteil is the fact that
the agency has to act and has to respect the legal
interpretation the court found in its decision. 156
154 w. Schmi tt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 177; a decision
called Spruchreife will only be made if there are no doubts
at all about the factual and legal assumptions because the
court of course may not enforce the agency to make a certain
decision with which the court would substitute its own
decision for that of the agency
155 F. Kopp, supra note 64, p. 984
156 W.Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 178; "to respect"
does not necessarily mean the same as "to obey" because the
agency still can make a discretionary decision within the
legal boundaries
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As the U.S. legal system is a common law system the degree
or the extent of the judicial review itself may change. ~64
Congress can either provide the right to obtain jUdicial
review or it can withdraw an existing right to obtain
jUdicial review~65 as long as it does not interfere with the
consti tutionally guaranteed rights. ~66
obtain jUdicial review if a person suffers a "legal wrong"
except for the regulation in APA § 701 (a) which rules that
persons do have the right to obtain jUdicial review "except
to the extent that (1) statutes preclude jUdicial review or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law"; good representation: Cynthia Tripi, "Availability of
Judicial Review of Administrative Action",53 Geo.Wash.Law
Rev. 729,730, (1987)
~64as was demonstrated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 s.ct. 2778,
81 L.Ed. 2d 694, (1984); as well as the law itself may
change: "Ratio est legis anima; mutata legis rations mutatur
et lex", "The reason for the law is its soul; when the
reason for the law changes, the law changes as well", see:
A.Scalia, supra note 160, p. 515
~65Art III of the U.S. Constitution; a case where the
Supreme Court upheld a statute of Congress that withdrew
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even after the
case has been orally argued before the Supreme Court: Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868)
~66Winfried Brugger, "Einfuehrung in das Oeffentliche Recht
der U.S.A.", pp. 185-188,(1993); with Goldberg v. Kelly
{397 U.S. 254, 90 S. ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970)} the
Supreme Court accepted the possibility to protect
entitlements or "privileges" whereas before this decision
there was a clear distinction between "rights" and
"privileges" and the possibility to obtain judicial review
to protect the "due process of law- requirements"; since the
decision in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth
{408 U.S. 564, 92 S.ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)} the
Supreme Court attached importance to the question of the
individual affection and the interpretation of the meaning
of "life, liberty and property"
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APA § 703 rules that if a "special statutory review
proceeding relevant to the subject matter" was created by
Congress the plaintiff has to bring his/her lawsuit in the
court mentioned in the statute. Besides this "statutory
review" there also is a "non - statutory review" enlisted in
APA § 703. If no explicit court was mentioned in the statute
the plaintiff may take "any applicable form of legal
action" in a "court of competent jurisdiction" .167
If there are no special rules that mention which court is
the competent one the general rules for federal courts have
to be contacted, like e.g. 28 U.S.C .A. § 1331.168
The statutes of the APA do apply if there is the possibility
to obtain jUdicial review but they do not give jurisdiction
to a special court or federal courts .169
b) presumption of reviewability
Before the APA was enacted in 1946 the courts had to find
out whether Congress intended to authorize the courts to
review the administrative action. Language, structure,
purpose and legislative history of the respective statute
1n W.Brugger, supra note 166, p. 204
168 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or
treatise of the U.S.", 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331
1~ Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.ct. 980,
51 L.Ed. 2d 192, (1977)
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served as means to help the courts in evaluating Congress'
intent. 170
After the APA was enacted it became easier for courts to
find out whether they could review an administrative action
or whether they could not. Two sections of the APA evidently
favor a "presumption of review". APA § 703 rules that:
"Except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive
opportunity for judicial review is provided by law, agency
action is subject to review in civil or criminal proceedings
for jUdicial enforcement". APA § 704 says that "Agency
action made reviewable by statute and final agency action
for which there is no adequate remedy in a court are subject
to jUdicial review". This statutory "presumption of
reviewability" was favored and strengthened by the Court's
decision in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.171 In this
decision the Supreme Court - researching the APA's
legislative history172 - confirmed this "presumption of
reviewability": "[The APA's] generous review provisions must
be given a hospitable interpretation ..•. [and] only upon a
showing of clear and convincing evidence of a contrary
170 see: C. Tripi, supra note 163, 729,731; a good
historical overview over the administrative process and the
APA: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, pp. 27-33
171 387 U,S. 136, 87 S.ct 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681, (1967)
172 see: C.Tripi, supra note 163, 729,731
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legislative intent should the courts restrict access to
jUdicial reviewll•173
APA § 701 (a) is an exception to the IIpresumption of
reviewabilityll and it rules that "[T]his chapter applies,
according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent
that - (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency
action is committed to agency discretion by lawll.
In its decision in citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe174 the Supreme Court found and decided that the
IIcommitted to agency discretionll exception of APA § 701 (a)
(2) of the general reviewability is a "very narrow
exception"175 that applies only "in those instances where
statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case
there is no law to apply" .176
Even though a decision may be "committed to agency
discretion" it nevertheless may be reviewable.
In Doe v. Casey177 the D.C. Circuit held that "(1)
congressional intent to preclude review must be established
by clear and convincing evidence; (2) that the existence of
173387 U. S • 136, 141
174401 U.S. 402, 91 S.ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971)
1m 401 U.S. 402, 410
U6 401 U.S. 402, 410
177796 F 2d 1508, 254 U.S. App. D.C. 282 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
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statutory standards is evidence of intent not to preclude
review; and (3) that the structure of the statutory scheme
may support a finding of congressional intent to preclude
review only if the scheme is extremely complex or delicately
balanced" .178
Though of course there have been changes in the law and in
the statutory interpretation there still is the "presumption
of reviewability".1~ Cases dealing with reviewability or
"unreviewability" do not oppose this "presumption of
reviewability" but as there are statutes without a very
clear congressional intent180 these cases help to develop and
to apply a standard on how to "review" without explicit
regulations of Congress.
c) presumption of unreviewability
APA § 701 (a) (1) (2) regulates the exceptions to the
"presumption of reviewability". Very important are the words
"to the extent" of APA § 701 (a).
178 C.Tripi, supra note 163, p.740; 796 F 2d 1508, 1514,
1515 - 1516
~9 see especially P.Strauss, supra note 10, p. 221
180Justice Scalia believes that in the" •••vast majority of
cases •..• Congress neither (1) intended a single result,
nor (2) meant to confer discretion upon the agency, but
rather (3) didn't think about the matter at all", see supranote 160, p. 517
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The meaning and the extent of the preclusion by law have
been controversial and object of many Supreme Court
decisions .181This is a difficult problem and it is very
important for the respective addressee. Congress' intent is
not always expressed very clear in the statutes. Main
problem for the courts therefore is to find out whether and
to what extent Congress intended to preclude judicial
review182 and to find the amount of discretionary power the
agency was authorized to use by Congress without being
jUdicial reviewable.1~
Figuring out to what extent Congress intended to preclude
judicial review the Supreme Court followed congressional
intention but nevertheless often upheld its authority to
review constitutional questions. 184
181a thorough analysis and discussion of "unreviewability":
Ronald M. Levin, "Understanding Unreviewability in
Administrative Law", in: 74 Minnesota Law Review 689, (1990)
182APA § 701 (a) (1)
183APA § 701 (a) (2 )
184"To avoid a constitutional confrontation, the Court
assumes that Congress did not intend a preclusion of review
provision to deny the Court the power of constitutional
review", Paul R. Verkuil, "Congressional Limitation on
Judicial Review of Rules", 57 Tulane L.Rev. 733, 737,
(1983); see also the distinction between "constitutional
review" and "statutory review" explained and presented by
Paul Verkuil, ide ad 746-750
81
Even though in some cases Congress explicitly excluded
judicial review entirely it is quite easy to understand that
courts nonetheless still can review constitutional issues.
It can be very difficult though if Congress limits jUdicial
review because the borders or the amount of this limitation
may not be very clear. If Congress did not clearly state
whether there should be limits of judicial review and which
limits there should be the courts mostly assume that
Congress did intend to provide the possibility to obtain
jUdicial review for the addressee.1.8S
Problematic for the courts though can be the question
whether the action of the agency was within the limits of
its congressionally delegated discretion and whether this
discretion is reviewable or whether it is not.
The decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe186
stated that the "committed to agency discretion" exception
of reviewability of agency action enacted in APA § 701 (a)
(2) is a "very narrow exception" that precludes review "in
those rare instances where statutes are drawn in such broad
terms that in a given case there is no law to apply" .187
18Ssee: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p. 124
1.86401 U.S. 402, 91 S.ct. 814, 28 L.Ed. 2d 136 (1971)
187401 U. S. 402, 410
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The decision was the "starting point"l.88of the Supreme Court
analyzing the reviewability of discretionary actions and
because it was a very narrow interpretation of
APA § 701 (a) (2) - but nevertheless contained a
confirmation of the "presumption of reviewability" - this
decision therefore can be seen as to grant courts the
possibili ty to review "almost any agency action" .189
A more recent decision of the Supreme Court with weighty
influence on the "unreviewabili ty" was Heckler v. Chaney. 190
This case concerned the refusal of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to take a certain demanded action .191
The Supreme Court refused to order the FDA to perform the
demanded action. In its decision the Court found that an
agency's refusal to take action under its substantive
statute was presumptively unreviewable192 and with that the
Supreme Court broadened the meaning of APA § 701 (a) (2).
In the Heckler v. Chaney decision the Supreme Court did not
intend to remove the "no law to apply" - doctrine
188PiercejShapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p.125
189PiercejShapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24., p. 125
"0 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed. 2d 714 (1985)
191as the definition of "agency action" includes the
"failure to act", APA § 551 (13), courts generally may
review inaction of agencies
192470 U.S. 821,831
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established in the Overton Park - decision but more than
that stated that "review is not to be had if the statute is
drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard
against which to judge the agency's exercise of
discretion" .193
So whenever the substantive statute at issue reveals a
congressional intent to preclude review, whenever there is
"no law to apply" or whenever the agency used its
discretionary power there is no jUdicial review available.
d) committed to agency discretion?
A problem closely related to the reviewability or
"unreviewability" of agency action is the question whether
an action was "committed to agency discretion"194 and whether
- or: to what extent - a court can control decisions where
an agency used discretionary power.
There of course are discretionary actions which are not
reviewable at all because they have no legal impact. If
there is no legal impact in most cases there is no necessity
for the citizen to take any legal action. If the use of the
discretionary power has a legal impact it is necessary to
know if there are legal actions which can be used to control
the discretionary action.
193 470 U. S • 821, 830
194 APA § 701 (a) ( 2 )
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If an agency used its congressionally delegated authority to
make a discretionary decision the court can not substitute
its opinion for the one of the agency. Quite often the
amount of discretion Congress wanted to delegate to the
agency is not stated explicitly and as there are no rules
which regulate how to use the discretion - there may arise
problems about how to control which actions.
Source of discretion used by an agency can be either the
Consti tution or a statute. 195 Discretion provided by the
Constitution is especially used by the executive.196 Usually
the source of discretion197 used by administrative agencies
are statutes enacted by Congress to delegate power to the
agencies.
If Congress delegated discretionary power it can either give
explicit standards on how to use this discretion or it can
195 see: Peter Shane, "Federal Policy Making by Consent
Decree: An Analysis of Agency and Judicial Discretion", 1987
U.Chi.Legal F. 241, p.7, (1987)
196 though the administrative agencies are part of the
executive the addressee of this kind of discretionary power
more likely is the President than an administrative agency
197 some people divide discretion into different categories
in which discretion can be used; see: Charles Koch,
"Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion", 54 Geo.
Wash. L.Rev.469, 470 ,(1986); surely discretion can be
categorized but the question is whether this really is
necessary and whether this is useful because discretion is
treated as discretion by courts and not as discretion #1
or discretion #3
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delegate this power without standards. 198If there is no
explicit standard given by Congress a court may have
difficulties finding out exactly to what extent Congress
wanted to delegate discretionary power to the agency.
Courts generally permit agencies a lot of discretion
concerning the interpretation of statutes, to choose
procedures and in all aspects of decision making and fact
finding.u9 Courts usually defer to the agencies decision if
they are "convinced"20o that the respective topic has been
"committed to agency discretion". Though courts defer to
agency discretion they of course always can examine whether
the agency exceeded its rights and they can overcome the
"presumption of reviewability" by proving that there is "law
to apply". This guideline established with the Overton Park
decision is very helpful for the courts because if there is
"law to apply" the court can find out whether the agency
interpreted the statute in the correct way. 201The Overton
Park - decision of the Supreme Court was very important for
198see PiercejShapirojVerkuil, supra note 24. p.40
199PiercejShapirojVerkuil, supra note 24, P .116
~O P. Strauss, supra note 10, p.221; in cases of "high
uncertainty, courts are likely to read congressional
limitations into the statute", Martin Shapiro,
"Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage", 92 Yale L.J.
1487, 1508, (1983)
201see supra, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402
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the development of the reviewability of administrative
action.202 This decision strengthened the "presumption of
reviewability" by finding out when a decision of the agency
is within its delegated discretionary power and therefore
can be reviewed by the courts. The decision in Heckler v.
Chaney203 stated that an administrative agency's decision not
to take action should be considered presumptively immune
from judicial review. But even though discretionary actions
of the agencies are presumptively unreviewable there are
mistakes the agency can make finding its decision that are
reviewable by a court.204
As to procedural rules stated in the APA the Supreme Court's
decision in Vermont Yankee2~ made clear that the APA enacts
a certain amount/number of procedural rules which is the
maximum of procedural rules reviewable by the courts. If an
agency wants to grant more and additional procedural rules
it is free to do so. A court can not force an agency to
grant more procedural rights or rules than those granted by
202P.Strauss calls this decision the "Baedeker of jUdicial
review", supra note 10, p. 261
203470 U.S. 821; this decision was very important as it
invented a "new standard" of jUdicial review, see laterpp. 89 - 91
~4 see: M.Shapiro, supra note 200, p.1490
205Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc, 435 U.S. 519, 98 S.ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978)
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the APA though because courts are not "free to impose them".
Evidently a court can review the agency decision if the
agency made a decision "in excess of statutory
authority" or "short of statutory rights" .2Q6
2) judicial review of which actions?
a) statutory review
After the question whether the action of the administrative
agency is reviewable or whether it is unreviewable is solved
the second question then is whether the possibility to
obtain judicial review is (a) written down in the respective
statute or (b) whether the agency's action was made
reviewable by the general provisions of the APA.2Q7 The
possibility mentioned under (a) is called "statutory review"
and "occurs pursuant to a statute designating a particular
court or courts to exercise review authority over described
decisions of a particular agency". 208 The second possibility
mentioned above under (b) is called "non-statutory review"
and "is available whenever the party seeking review can
206 APA § 706 (2)(c)
207 APA § 701 (a): judicial review is provided except "to
the extent that (1) statutes preclude review; or (2) the
agency action is committed to agency discretion by law"
208 p.strauss, supra note 10, p.212
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frame a complaint that meets the general requirements for
invoking the jurisdiction of the courts. a09
Usually the organic act that creates an agency provides that
the actions of the agency based on an evidential record are
reviewable by a court, mostly by a court of appeals. 2~O
If there is a statute providing jUdicial review in most
cases this respective statute will govern the time, venue
and form of review.au The statute which served as an example
and was copied many times was the Federal Trade Commissions
Act •2~2
APA § 702 rules that the United states shall be "an
indispensable party" except for suits for money damages.
The Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner2~3 decision showed that if
there should be doubts whether Congress intended to provide
the possibility to obtain judicial review the courts presume
m9 P.Strauss, supra note 10, p. 212
2~OK.C.Davis, supra note 21, vol. 4, p. 131;
sometimes district courts are the right courts to obtain
statutory review, DaVis, ide ad p. 133; to keep in
mind though is the fact that appellate jurisdiction of
federal appellate courts always and only is statutory
review, p.strauss, supra note 10, p.212
au P.Strauss, supra note 10, p.212
2~2enacted 1914; 15 U.S.C. § 45 (c): "Any person,
partnership or corporation required by an order of the
commission ••... may obtain a review of such order in the
court of appeals of the United states .••"
213387 U.S. 136, 87 S.ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed. 2d 681, (1967)
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that congressional intent was in favor of providing judicial
review. 214
b) non - statutory review
As mentioned above there either can be a statutory guarantee
of the possibility to obtain jUdicial review or the general
rules of the APA (with the "presumption of reviewability")
provide the possibility to obtain jUdicial review. APA § 703
rules that "[I]n the absence or inadequacy" of statutory
review provisions "any applicable form of legal action,
including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of
prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus" can be
taken "in a court of competent jurisdiction". Therefore
there is the possibility to obtain jUdicial review even if
this is not explicitly mentioned in the respective statute
as long as the statute does not preclude review or the
action was "committed to agency discretion by law".215
D4 387 U.S. 136,141; of course this can help to distinct
between "statutory" and "non-statutory" review but usually
this should not be a question of whether there is "statutory
review" or "non-statutory review" but instead of that it is
useful and helpful to find out whether there is the
possibility to obtain jUdicial review at all or whether thispossibility does not exist
215 APA § 701 (a)(2)
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c) administrative action - inaction
Some scholars/lawyers are convinced that there is the
general reluctance to review administrative inaction216 but
as the definition of "agency action" includes the failure to
act217 courts sometimes may review agency inactions. 218 The
review of agency inaction therefore is possible even though
it is not possible to the same extent as the review of
action is.219 As with every lawsuit against an action a
lawsuit against an inaction has to fulfill certain
requirements. These requirements are (a) that the plaintiff
has to have suffered a "legal wrong" through the inaction,
216 see: Paul Lehner, "Judicial Review of Administrative
Inaction", 83 Col.L.Rev. 627 (1983); the reasons Lehner
gives though are more than questionable: separation of
powers, lack of constitutional authority to intervene or the
fact that nonimplementation suits are not like common law
suits, ide ad 631-633; especially dubious are his reasons in
favor of a judicial review of agency inaction: "The general
inability of the other branches to control agency action
••• is particularly evident in the nonimplementation
context", id.ad 638/639; this should not be a question about
which branch has the most influence or power to control
agency action; but besides this Congress or the executive
could control agency inaction very easy through enacting
certain rules limiting and directing the discretionarychoice of the agency
217 APA § 551 (13)
218 as used in this thesis "inaction" means the refusal of
an administrative agency to act in a certain way demanded orrequested by a citizen
219 this is necessary as "Discretionary power not to enforce
is the power to discriminate" K.C.Davis, Supra note 21,Vol.2, p. 218
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(b) the agency action may not be totally "committed to
agency discretion by law" and (c) the inaction must be a
"final" agency action. 220
One of the problems for the courts often is to find out
whether the refusal to act is a "final" agency decision or
whether the agency is still thinking about the request. 221.
Generally courts are allowed to control whether the agency's
failure to take the requested action was arbitrary and
capricious222 after the courts found whether the agency's
decision was within the statutory boundaries.
An important decision concerning the reviewability of non-
enforcement of an action was Dunlop v. Bachowski. 223 The
problem in this case was whether the rule of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 u.s.c. § 482
(b), which held that the Secretary of Labor "shall"
investigate complaints and "shall .•• bring a civil action"
220 Lehner, supra note 216, p. 646; see: Raymond Murphy,
"The Scope of Review of Agencies' Refusal to Enforce or
Promulgate Rules", 53 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 86,87, (1984)
221. see: R.Murphy, supra note 220, pp. 88,89
222 "Calculation of the arbitrary and capricious standard
along a sliding scale of deference is appropriate only where
the agency has some discretion", Lehner, supra note 216,
p.665; a question is whether Lehner wants the "arbitrary and
capricious standard" to be on a sliding scale, too,
(diminishing or broadening the extent of the standard) which
would be arbitrary and capricious itself
2n 421 U.S. 560, 95 S.ct. 1851, 44 L.Ed. 2d 377 (1975)
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was jUdicial reviewable. The Supreme Court held that the
Secretary's decision not to take action was reviewable for
arbitrariness. The Court reasoned that the Secretary had
failed to provide "clear and convincing evidence that
Congress meant to prohibit all jUdicial review of his
decision".224 The Secretary therefore "must provide the court
and the complaining witnesses with copies of a statement of
reasons supporting his determination". 225
Though the Secretary has discretion whether he wants to act
or not the reasons for this decision he has to provide
nevertheless make it possible to control whether he acted
arbitrary.
d) discretionary actions
As mentioned above226 it can be very difficult for the courts
to find out whether Congress intended to delegate
discretionary power to the agencies.
Until the decision in Heckler v.Chaney227 there has been the
general "presumption of unreviewability" of discretionary
224421 U.s. 567
n5 421 U.S. 571, APA § 555 (e) rules that "[E]xcept in
affirming a prior denial or when the denial is
selfexplanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by a brief
statement of the grounds for denial"
226see: PART III, A) c)/d)
227470 U. S. 821
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agency actions. First step to establish a standard to review
discretionary actions of agencies was the Supreme Court's
decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe.228 In
this decision the Supreme Court stated that judicial review
is precluded only "in those rare instances where statutes
are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is
no law to apply". 229 More than just to control whether the
agency acted "arbitrary and capricious" or with "an abuse of
discretion"230 with this decision the courts were given a
standard to examine whether the reasons that led to the
discretionary decision were within the statutory's
boundaries. After the Overton Park decision the Heckler v.
Chaney decision defined the established standard to review
discretionary agency actions even more explicitly. The
question in this case was whether an agencies discretionary
decision not to take action was jUdicial reviewable. The
Supreme Court found that a decision not to take action is
presumptively committed to agency discretion. The Court
reasoned that because the agency had to balance several
factors which were within the area in which the agency had
special expertise this decision therefore was a
discretionary decision. Heckler v. Chaney established a "two
228 401 U. S. 402
229401 U.S. 402,410
230 APA § 706 (2)(A)
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step" standard: (a) the first question is whether there are
certain "manageable standards"231 by which the agency's
action may be judged. The answer to this question can be
found within the respective statute's language. 232Very
important concerning this first question is to keep in mind
that even when an agency action may be presumed immune from
jUdicial review this is only a presumption which can be
rebutted if the respective statute provided certain
guidelines for the agency.233 Consulting these "guidelines"
the court can review the discretionary action and control
whether the discretion was abused or used in an arbitrary
and capricious way.
(b) The second step tries to distinguish the question of
"reviewabili ty" from balancing "pragmatic considerations". 234
The Justices found that this was a question of the scope of
review and therefore was inappropriate to determinations of
reviewability. With this "Chevron - standard of review" the
courts were given concrete measures how to review
discretionary actions of an agency.
231 105 S.ct. 1655
2~ R. Levin, supra note 181, 689,713,714
233what leads to the question whether there is "law to
apply"
234Sharon Werner, "The Impact of Heckler v. Chaney on
Judicial Review of Agency Decisions", 86 Colum. L.Rev.
1247,1256 (1986)
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e) rulemaking and adjudication
(aa) Agencies generally act through adjudication or through
rulemaking.235 If an agency enacts rules it does so to
develop policy standards and rules for future applications.
To serve this purpose rules are abstract and affect not only
one individual but as they establish general and abstract
standards they affect many people. 236 As rules have a great
power and influence many people rulemaking often is called
"quasi - legislative". 237 As rules may have an enormous
influence the organic act of the respective agency has to
say whether the agency may enact rules or whether it may
not.238 Some agencies may be allowed to use the power of
rulemaking quite often whereas other agencies may not be
allowed to use this "instrument" at all. The APA provides
three different kinds of rules: (i) formal rules,
(ii) informal rules, and (iii) interpretative rules. These
three kinds of rules differ in their specific procedural
requirements and in the aim they are used to or will be used
to achieve. These procedural requirements are the main
235 to the distinction between rules and adjudication, see:
William Andreen, "Exercise of Administrative Power and
JUdicial Review", 50 Ala.Law 322,323, (1989)
236 Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p. 292
2n Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p. 184
238 Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p.293
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guidelines for the jUdicial review as the contents of these
rules very often may be within the discretionary power of
the agencies. Usually the agencies are free to choose in
which of those ways they want to act unless the organic act
of the respective agency orders the agency to act in a
certain way. The definition of a rule is enacted in
APA § 553.
(1) In general the APA rules that the informal procedures
apply to all substantive rules unless a rule is "required by
statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing", 5 U.S.C. § 553 (c). As the name already
suggests formal rulemaking involves broad and complicated
guidelines of agency policy. 239 There are three procedural
requirements that are necessary for a formal rule: (i) APA
§ 553 (b) rules that there has to be a notice240 "published
in the Federal Register"; (ii) APA § 556 says that an agency
must hold an evidentiary hearing to give the participating
parties the possibility to present oral and documentary
evidence and to crossexamine witnesses; (iii) APA §§ 556
(e), 557 order that at the end of the hearings the agency
must base its conclusions and findings just on the evident
record produced during the course of the proceeding.
239 w. Andreen, supra note 235, 322,324
240 this notice has to contain time, nature and place of the
proceeding as well as the legal authority
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The most difficult task for reviewing courts is the question
whether Congress wanted the agency to make a formal or an
informal rule. Usually the statute must not only order a
hearing but must also contain the phrase "on the record" or
some "equivalent verbalization"241 that clearly states the
congressional intent to require a formal rulemaking. Because
congressional intent is not always very clear the Supreme
Court established a questioning procedure to find out what
kind of agency action was "at stake"242: the examination
begins at the lowest level with the question whether the
agency's action was rulemaking or adjudication. If it is
rulemaking, the next question is whether the organic statute
of the respective agency mentions the "magic words"243 "on
the record" or an equivalent. If it does it has to be a
formal rule and if it does not the requirements for an
informal rule have to be fulfilled.
(2) Though the name might indicate differently - informal
rules are substantive law, binding on courts, agencies and
of course private parties. 244
241Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p.294
242United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co.,
410 U.S. 224, 241, 93 S.ct. 810, 35 L.Ed. 2d 223, (1973)
243Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p. 294
U4 united States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695, 94 S.Ct.
3090, 41 L.Ed. 2d 1039 (1974)
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Enacting an informal rule the agency is required to fulfill
three procedural necessities: (i) the agency has to publish
a notice of the proposed rUlemaking in the Federal Register,
APA § 553 (b)i (ii) after publishing their intention of
rUlemaking the agency has to give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through
submission of written data, views or arguments, APA § 553
(c) (the agency may give the opportunity for an oral hearing
but it is not required to do so); (iii) the agency then has
to publish both the final rule and a "concise and general
statement" of the rule's basis and purpose, APA § 553 (c).
The agency - though it is not required - may provide more
procedural participation possibilities for interested
persons, such as two rounds of notice or additional oral
hearings.24s As the Supreme Court stated very clear though in
Vermont Yankee246 courts may not impose procedures other than
those required by the APA. Very important for judicial
review are the statements of the agencies accompanying the
final rule about the basis and purpose of the final rule
because this is the principal basis for jUdicial review of
the substance of the rule.
(3) The third possibility for an agency to enact a rule is
the interpretative rule which is defined as to "interpret or
2G P.Strauss, supra note 10, p.156
246 453 U. S . 1030 (1973)
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clarify the nature of the duties previously created by
passage of a statute or promulgation of a legislative
rule" .247 Quite often the agency has the choice whether it
enacts an interpretative rule or a legislative (informal)
rule. The decision in favor of one of the rules often is
important only concerning the procedural requirements that
have to be obtained. Usually no procedures have to be
fulfilled if an agency enacts an interpretative rule unless
a specific statute or the organic act of the respective
agency requires certain procedures.248 Although the nature of
an interpretative rule implies that the rule states an
opinion or the usual procedural requirements of the
respective agency they nevertheless may have great impact on
people dealing with the agency. This impact will even be
manifested and strengthened if the agency publishes the
interpretative rule because with this publication the rule
achieves a "formal status that may entitle it to
deference" .249 There have been two important decisions
dealing and clarifying the nature and status of
interpretative rules. The first case, Joseph v. United
247 PiercejShapirojVerkuil, supra note 24, p. 285
~8 p.strauss, supra note 10, p. 157
2~ p.strauss, supra note 10, p.158
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states civil Service Commission250, dealt with a rule of
which the Commission thought it would be an interpretative
rule and therefore not reviewable. The D.C. Circuit argued
that (i) the statutory provision authorized the Commission
to act by legislative rule and (ii) that more than that the
Commission intended the rule to have the full force of law
which an interpretative rule can not establish. Because of
this the Commission was required to follow the APA
rulemaking procedures and as it did not the rule was
invalid. General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus251 dealt with a
rule enacted by the Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.)
which the agency itself thought to be an interpretative
rule. Nevertheless the E.P.A. tried to order G.M. to act in
a certain way so that G.M. argued that if it had to follow
the agency's order based on this rule the rule then would be
a legislative rule and because the procedural necessities
required for a legislative rule have not been obeyed when
the rule was enacted this rule would be invalid. The D.C.
Circuit found that the rule was an interpretative rule and
therefore the rule could not have the force of law the
agency wanted it to have. Besides the interpretative rule
250 554 F. 2d 1140, 180 U.S. App. D.C. 281 (D.C.Cir. 1977)
2M 724 F.2d 979, 253 U.S. App. D.C. 95, (D.C. Cir. 1983)
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there is another exempt from the APA rulemaking
requirements, the general statements of policy.252
(bb) The distinction between rulemaking and adjudication
sometimes can be quite difficult.253 Usually there are
certain procedural requirements that can be of help to make
this distinction. Furthermore only a small number of persons
should be affected by adjudications and many people by
rulemaking. Nevertheless the agency itself may act with one
type of these possibilities although it wants to have the
benefits of one of the other possibilities with which it
could have acted. This was demonstrated in two Supreme Court
cases. In Londoner v. City & Council of Denver254 the agency
enacted a quasi - legislative rule which affected only a few
people. Because it affected only few people the agency gave
notice and an opportunity to comment only in a written form,
a request for an oral hearing was denied by the agency.255
252to the distinction between rules and general statements
of policy: Pacific Gas & Electronic Co. v. Federal Power
Commission, 506 F.2d 33, 164 U.S. App.D.C. 371 (D.C.Cir
1974); see also: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24,
pp. 287 - 289
253for a general and helpful distinction: K.C.Davis, supra
note 21, vol.2, pp. 307 - 311
254210 U.S. 373, 28 S.ct. 708, 52 L.Ed. 1103 (1908)
~5 210 U.S. 373, 385 - 386
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The Supreme Court held that this refusal violated the due
process of law - clause because not quasi - legislative but
adjudicative procedures were required to give the affected
people the opportunity of an oral presentation. 256
The other case was Bi - Metallic Investment Co. v. state
Board of Equalization257 which concerned a case where the
city of Denver increased the value of all taxable property
in Denver by 40 %. Here again the agency did not offer the
possibility to obtain an oral hearing. The Court held that
this case did not require an oral hearing as the Londoner v.
Denver decision did because in Londoner only a small number
of people were affected whereas the Bi - Metallic case
affected a general number of persons in the same way. The
Court argued that this was a policy oriented rule that had a
"legislative" character and therefore no oral presentation
was required.
To distinguish between rulemaking and adjudication though
not only an examination of the procedural requirements that
have been used by the agency are helpful and necessary but
also the number of people affected as well as the purpose of
the "action" are important, especially whether "new norms of
256 W.Andreen, supra note 235, 322,323;
Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, pp.229 - 236
257239 U.S. 441, 36 S.ct. 141,60 L.Ed. 372 (1915)
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conduct"258 shall be established. And even though an agency
may make law through adjudication259 where the agency usually
would have time to formulate new standards through enacting
laws "the choice made between proceeding by general rule or
by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily
in the informed discretion of the administrative agency". 260
(cc) Adjudication is defined as the "agency process for the
formulation of" any "final disposition, whether affirmative,
negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency
in a matter other than rule making but including licensing",
APA § 551 (6,7). Adjudications are used to decide and solve
cases where only few individuals are concerned. There are
two types of adjudication, the formal and the informal
adjudication. Usually the agency is free to decide whether
it will act through formal or informal adjudication unless
there is a "case of adjudication required by statute to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing".261 So only when Congress directed the agency to act
2~ P.Strauss, supra note 10, p.179
259see: K.C.Davis, supra note 21, vol.2, pp.118,110; Davis
argues that "Since courts may make rules by adjudication,
agencies may", id.ad p.119
260S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 - 203,
67 s.ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947)
261APA § 554 (a)
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through formal adjudication the agency is required to do
so •262
(1) If an agency acts through formal adjudication the
persons affected must be given notice of a hearing. The
notice of the hearing has to include "time, place and nature
of the hearings"26~, the "legal authority and jurisdiction
under which the hearing is to be held"264 as well as "the
matters of fact and law asserted". 265An employee or an
Administrati ve Law Judge266 presides over the formal
adjudication, APA § 556 (b).
After the nearing an initial decision will be issued which
contains "findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis
therefore, on all the material issues of fact, law or
discretion presented on the record", APA § 557 (c).
Either this initial decision becomes the final decision or
an appeal is taken to the agency where the agency may
262see: Marcello v. Bonds, 349 u. s. 302, 75 S.ct. 757,
99 L.Ed. 1107 (1985); either there is explicit congressional
indication in the statute or the legislative history has to
be questioned, see: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra
note 24, p.277
263APA § 554 (b) (1)
264APA § 554 (b )(2)
265APA § 554 (b) (3)
266who is an employee of the agency but nevertheless is
quite independent; very informative: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil,
supra note 24, pp.441 - 445
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undertake a de novo review of the Administrative Law Judge's
initial decision.
(2) All agency decisions that are not rulemaking nor formal
adjudication are informal adjudication. As the APA provides
only the rulemaking and the formal adjudication with a
procedural framework there is no procedural framework for
the informal adjudication. As nevertheless most of the
agency actions are made through informal adjudications~67
there have to be certain guidelines for courts to control
the agency action. Procedural safeguards have to be provided
through the due process - clause but only to the extent that
life, liberty or property are affected. The question that is
important though is especially what procedural safeguards
are needed and have to be guaranteed in the respective case.
A guideline to figure this out was established with the
Matthews v. Eldridge~68 decision of the Supreme Court.
Because there can not be a general standard for all informal
adjudications (as the advantage of the informal
adjUdications is that they deal with individual cases) this
guideline only figures out the procedural requirements
ordered by the due process clause for each respective and
individual case. The first question concerns the importance
of the private interests at stake, the second question
~67see: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p. 317
U8 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.ct. 893, 47 L.Ed. 2d 18 (1976)
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concerns the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private
interests through the used procedures and the last question
is about the governmental or agency's interests. Through
this inquiry several and different procedural requirements
can be ordered for the respective formal adjudication.
In P.B.G.C. v. L.T.C. corp.269 the Supreme Court found that
APA § 706 (2)(A) implicitly imposes on agencies a procedural
requirement to provide an explanation for an action taken
through the use of informal adjudication. These explanations
of course can be reviewed on whether they are "arbitrary,
capricious" or "an abuse of discretion", APA § 706 (2)(A).
(dd) The reviewing court shall review and decide all
relevant questions of law, APA § 706. APA § 706 (2)(A)
requires a court to decide whether the agency's decision was
arbitrary and capricious. APA § 706 (2)(F) rules that a
court shall review the agency's factfinding when new issues
are raised or when the procedures of factfinding for an
adjudicatory action are inadequate. The procedures the
agency is obliged to obey are reviewable by the court as
well as any inconsistency with statutory guidelines and
whether the agency gave sufficient supply of reasoned
analysis.270
269496 U.S. 633, 110 S.ct. 2668, 110 L.Ed.2d 579 (1990)
270Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 103 S.ct.
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3) scope of review
a) "findings of fact" and "conclusions of law"
APA § 706 regulates the extent of judicial review of
administrative actions, the scope of review. It rules that
the "reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning of applicability of the terms of an
agency action". As was mentioned before271 many decisions of
the administrative agencies are unreviewable or reviewable
only to a limited extent if the agencies use their
discretionary power. statutes authorizing agencies to act in
a certain way often delegate broad power so that the
agencies do have discretion in enforcing the statutory aim.
Because of this courts often have to defer to agency's
decisions and "ensure that agencies act only in ways that
are consistent with the legislative policy decisions
reflected in statutes that delegate power to agencies" .272
The power of the judicial branch therefore is limited. In
general there are three types of judicial review of facts,
there is (i) de novo review, (ii) review with the
substantial evidence test and (iii) there is the question
2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)
271 see supra PART III 1) c) p. 78; and PART III 1) d) p. 82
272 Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p. 331
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whether the agency acted arbitrary and capricious or abused
its discretion.;m The question which type of review has to
be applied refers to the respective statute authorizing the
agency to act and refers only to the extent of the judicial
review. The review of the facts itself is made possible
through APA § 557 (c) for formal rulemaking and formal
adjudication as the complete statements of all findings and
conclusions have to be stated on the record and therefore
are reviewable. As this is not necessary in informal
rulemaking courts only can review the general statement of
the basis and the purpose of the rule stated in the agency's
record. Cases dealing with informal adjudication are more
difficult as the authorizing statutes do not require the
agencies to state findings and conclusions at all. As
informal adjudications nevertheless may have severe impacts
on individuals the Supreme Court found in its decision in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe274 that a
reviewing court - to be able to review the agency's action -
must have "some basis"275 of the agency's findings to engage
in substantive review. In a later decision276 the Supreme
273P.Strauss, supra note 10, p. 245
274401 U.S. 402 (1971)
275Pierce/ShapirojVerkuil, supra note 24, p. 335
276P.B.G.C. v. L.T.C. Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990)
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Court strengthened its Overton Park decision. The Court
found that a reviewing court had the right to demand a
"brief explanationtt277 if an agency acted through informal
rUlemaking. This decision was based on APA § 706 (2)(A)
which the Supreme Court read as to order the agency to state
an explanation for its action to make it possible for the
reviewing court to find out whether the agency acted
arbitrary and capricious. Not only concerning findings of
facts but also concerning conclusions of law the courts very
often defer to an agency's construction of the statutes.
Courts defer to the respective agency's experience
concerning the statutes they are dealing with because they
very often find the agency's interpretation of the statute's
corresponding with the legislative history278 and because
they accept that the agencies do have greater expertise. 279
In N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publ. Inc. 280 the Supreme Court stated
that " where the question is one of specific application of
a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency
administering the statute must determine it initially, the
277 Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p.336
278 P.Strauss, supra note 10, p. 250
279 see R. Nagareda, supra note 37, 591, 593
280 332 U.S. 111, 64 S.ct . 851, 88 L.Ed . 1170 (1944)
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reviewing court's function is limited".281 The interpretation
of a statute made by the agency should be accepted as long
as it has "warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in
law" .282The Supreme Court's decision in Chevron, U. S.A. ,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense council283 established a
I1new standard of reviewl1 which made it difficult for courts
to overturn policy choices of agencies which were made upon
legal interpretations of statutes administered by the
respective agency.
First question of this "Chevron - test" is whether Congress
has spoken to the issue at all. If it did (but not
explicitly) the second question for the court is whether the
agency's decision was based on a permissible construction of
the statute. 284The Supreme Courts decision in Chevron
combined with the Vermont Yankee decision "severely
restricted the authority of federal courts to prescribe
rules for agencies, to review agency legal analysises, to
ensure ,consistency in agency interpretations, and, to some
281id.ad 131
282ide ad 131
283467 U. S . 837, 104 S.ct . 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984)
284see: Kenneth W. Starr, "Judicial Review in the Post -
Chevron Era", 3 Yale J. on Reg. 283,287 (1986)
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U6 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.ct. 206, 83 L.Ed.126 (1938)
285 K.Starr, supra note 284, p. 306
LAW liBRARY
UN~VERSITYOF GEOrgC
287 id.ad 229
extent, to overturn agency pol icy choices". 285 Though the
decision makes it more difficult for a court to review an
agency's conclusions of law it still is not impossible. The
respective statute may be narrow and order a strict judicial
control or the statute may be broad and authorize broad
discretionary power. Either way the statute shows
legislators' intent and the arbitrary and capricious test
remains for further inquiries.
b) substantial evidence
APA § 706 (2)(E) rules that the "reviewing court shall- (2)
held unlawful and set aside agency action found to be
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence II. As the APA
does not define or explain what "substantial evidence" is -
the Supreme Court evaluated and invented a standard in
several decisions. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B.U6
the Court stated that "Substantial evidence ••.• means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion" .287 Another decision that
helped to define the substantial evidence was Universal
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Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B •.288 This decision stated that the
evidence must be "sufficient to support the conclusion of a
reasonable person after considering the evidentiary record
as a whole, not just the evidence that is consistent with
the agency's finding". 289 Concerning the informal rulemaking
and the informal adjudication procedures the APA does not
rule that the findings of fact have to be reviewed under the
substantial evidence test. Instead of the APA the respective
organic act of the agency sometimes does290 and the notice,
comments and statements of the agency's basis of the
informal rule serve the courts to use the substantial
evidence test.
c) de novo review
When "fundamental rights" or constitutional rights are at
issue the court may expand its scope of review and grant de
novo review. 291 De novo review means that a new tribunal will
288 340 U.S . 474, 71 S.ct . 456, 95 L.Ed • 456 (1951)
~9 Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p.337; in a case
that might be seen as an "extreme" one the Court held that
an agency can base its finding on a "reasonable prudent
person"(Pierce/ShapirojVerkuil, supra note 24, p.339) even
if this hearsay evidence should be contradicted by a non-
hearsay evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91
S.ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)
ao Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p. 339
291 a thorough article about de novo review: Judah
A. Shechter, "De Novo Judicial Review of Administrative
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examine the arguments and the evidence292of the respective
case anew. This so - called Ben Avon doctrine293 that ruled
that a full jUdicial review is necessary if constitutional
facts are at issue was established in Ohio Valley water Co.
v. Ben Avon Brough.294An earlier case295which is "clearly
still law"296ruled that a person has a right to de novo
review when an agency action takes away "all that makes live
worth living". 297De novo review therefore is necessary where
consti tutional fact review is at stake. 2!18The balancing test
of the de novo review of constitutional facts most likely is
Agency Factual Determinations Implicating Constitutional
Rights", 88 Columbia L.Rev. 1483 (1988)
292Kenneth F. Warren, "Administrative Law", p.397 (1982)
~3 K.C.Davis, supra note 39, p.69
294253 U.S. 287, 40 S.ct. 527, 64 L.Ed. 908 (1920); this
Ben Avon doctrine "may not only be dead but forgotten"
K.Davis, supra note 39, p.69
295Ng Fung Ho v. white, 259 U.S. 276, 42 S.ct. 492, 66
L•Ed• 938 (1922)
296K.c.Davis, supra note 39, p. 69
297259 U.S• 276, 284
298see: J.Shechter, supra note 291, 1483,1486
114
the one established in the Matthews v. Eldridge299 decision
of the Supreme Court.
d) the "arbitrary and capricious" test
As the informal rulemaking and informal adjudication are not
subjected to the substantial evidence test but nevertheless
there has to be some form of review - the APA makes it
possible for courts to review the agency's findings of facts
under the arbitrary and capricious test. 300 The arbitrary and
capricious test therefore is the only standard of review
that applies to certain agency actions. 301 The extent as well
as the precise meaning of the arbitrary and capricious test
have undergone several changes. In Louisiana Pacific states
Box & Basket Co. v. Whi te302 the Supreme Court established a
"loose rational relation" test. This loose rational relation
test primarily was used in cases where no fundamental rights
have been involved. In its Overton Park303 decision the
Supreme Court turned away from this loose rational relation
test and articulated that the arbitrary and capricious test
299 424 U.S . 319 (1976)
300 APA § 706 (2)(A)
301 P.Strauss, supra note 10, p. 248
~2 296 U.S. 176, 56 S.ct. 159, 82 L.Ed. 138 (1935)
~3 401 U.S. 402 (1971)
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should be "searching and careful". The explicit extent of
the judicial review of the arbitrary and capricious test is
not quite clear though. 304 Whereas some believe that there is
an eminent difference between the substantial evidence test
and the arbitrary and capricious test the D.C. Circuit
stated that "there is no substantive difference between
what" the arbitrary and capricious test "requires and what
would be required by the substantial evidence test, since it
is impossible to conceive a "nonarbitrary" factual judgement
supported only by evidence that is not substantial in the
APA sense ...".305 Though this may be a "simplified
statementu306 this decision makes clear that the arbitrary
and capricious test can establish a certain level of
judicial review that - applied to the agency's record - does
not necessarily has to differ very much from the substantial
evidence test.
e) excess of statutory jurisdiction?
The questions whether an agency acted "in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitation, or short of
304 see: P.Strauss , supra note 10, p.248
~5 Association of Data Processing service organization,
Inc. V. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
745 F.2d 677, 240 U.S. App. D.C. 301 (D.C.Cir. 1984)
306 at least that is what P.Strauss thinks, see supra
note 10, p. 249
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statutory right"307 or "without observance of procedure
required by law,p08 will be examined implicitly by the
reviewing court in most cases. As was mentioned309 if the
action is reviewable and if there is "law to apply" a court
can review the agency's decision even though courts have to
defer to the agency's interpretation as long "as a
reasonable mind might accept" the agency's decision "as
adequate to support a conclusion".310 If therefore Congress
expressed its intent and the agency chose a certain
interpretation of the statute the reviewing court may not
substitute its own decision for that of the agency.311 In the
M.L.R.B. v. Hearst publications312 decision the Supreme Court
already stated in 1944 that "the Board's determination
is to be accepted if it has warrant in the record and a
reasonable basis in law". And though the Supreme Court found
this decision it nevertheless used to decide different in
~7 APA § 706 (2)(C)
308APA § 706 (2) (D)
309see supra PART III, 1), pp. 77 - 83
3~ Consolidated Edison Co. v. M.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229
59 S.ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)
311see: p.strauss, supra note 10, pp. 249 - 256
312322 U. S • 111 , 64 S.Ct • 851, 88 L.Ed • 1170 (1944)
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some cases313 until it found the Chevron314 - decision. With
the Chevron decision the Supreme Court established a two
step inquiry in the agency's interpretation of statutes. In
later decisions315 the Supreme Court Justices used
"tradi tional tools of statutory construction"316 while
"working" with the Chevron standard to find out whether
Congress "spoke" to the question at issue and to review an
agency's construction of a statute. Even if the Justices may
disagree about the use of those traditional tools there is a
basis with which the statutory interpretation of agency's
can be controlled and reviewed by courts without
substituting the statutory interpretation of the judges for
the one of the agency.
f) "hard look" - review
Besides the substantial evidence test there also is the
"hard look" review which has been established through
313see: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p. 340
314467 U.S. 837 (1984)
315K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Corp., 486 U.S. 281, 108 S.ct.
1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988); Public citizens v. United
States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 109 S.ct. 2558,
105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989)
316Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p.352
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Supreme Court decisions. 317 The idea of the "hard look" was
to give courts the possibility to review whether an agency
had found its decision through taking a hard look at the
respective questions it was concerned with318 Nowadays courts
themsel ves take a "hard look" at the agency's decision. 319
This "hard look" is used especially in subjects concerning
important topics like health, safety and environment320 but
of course the courts can take the "hard look" only to the
extent to which the judges "understandtl321 the respective
topic. The scope of review used with the "hard look" review
may have different names, e.g. "substantial inquiry" or
"close scrutiny". 322 The review itself shall look for a
reasoned decisionmaking and should be narrow concerning the
control whether the agencies stayed within their statutory
317 e.g. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass. v. State Farm,
463 U.S. 29 (1983)
318 see: P.Strauss, supra note 10, p.268
319 see: William H. Rodgers, "A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee:
Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny", 67 Georgetown L.J.
699,704 (1979): "In the courts, •..• the most important
expression of the movement to reassert systematic control
over agency decisionmaking is called the hard look doctrine
of judicial review"
no P.Strauss, supra note 10, p.268
321 M. Shapiro, supra note 200, 1487, 1507
322 W .Rodgers , supra note 319, p. 704
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authorization.323 The borders to the substantial evidence
test may not be very clear but the hard look review may
establish a more narrow view than the substantial evidence
test. At least in cases concerning informal rulemaking and
informal adjudication which are not made reviewable by the
APA under the substantial evidence test324, the hard look -
review establishes an additional standard of review besides
the arbitrary and capricious test.
g) Chevron, U.S.A. v. N.R.D.C.
The decision in Chevron, U.S.A. Co. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council dealt with a statutory interpretation of the
E.P.A •• The agency interpreted the term "stationary source"
which is a term used in the 1970 and 1977 Amendments of the
Clean Air Act. 325 The question was whether the interpretation
of this term was correct or whether the agency acted
contrary to the legislators intent. The Court of Appeals326
that decided the case first found that Congress did not
explicitly express how it wanted the term "stationary
source" to be interpreted. As Congress did not explicitly
3D W.Rodgers, supra note 319, 705
324 see supra PART III, 2) e)
325 see: K.Starr, supra note 284, p. 288
326685 F.2d 718,222 U.S. App. D.C. 268 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
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state how it wanted this term to be interpreted the Court of
Appeals "felt free"327 to set the E.P.A. 's interpretation
aside and substitute it with its own interpretation. The
Court of Appeals found that the E.P.A.'s interpretation was
"incompatible with Congress' remedial purpose". 328Justice
stevens wrote for an unanimous Court and overturned the D.C.
Circuits decision. In this decision Justice stevens mainly
critizised that the D.C. Circuit substituted its own
decision for the agency's decision even after finding that
Congress did not explicitly express its intent.3~ The
Supreme Court did not just reverse the Court of Appeals
decision and substituted the interpretation the Justices
thought would be the correct one for that of the D.C.
Circuit or the one of the E.P.A. but it deferred to the
E.P.A.is interpretation and with the Chevron decision gave
up its "longstanding case ....by - case approach". 330More than
only critizising the Court of Appeals decision the Supreme
Court gave a good example and established a new standard
about how to approach an agency's interpretation of a
327K.Starr, supra note 284, p. 287
328685 F.2d 718, 726 - 727
329K.Starr, supra note 284, p.287
330Maureen B. Callahan, "A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron,
U.S.A., V. Natural Resources Defense Council",
1991 Wis.L.Rev. 1275, 1281 (1991)
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statute. This new standard of review contained a two step
approach to the respective statutory question at issue. The
first of the two steps concerns the question whether
Congress has explicitly spoken to the matter at issue. This
inquiry into legislative intent should be made regarding the
statute's language as well as the legislative history. 331The
second step of this Chevron approach is necessary only if
Congress' intent is not clear because if it is the agency
and the reviewing court have to defer to the legislators
will.3~ If Congress' intent should not be clear the second
question the Supreme Court stated was: "[I]f the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute". 333With
this two step approach the Supreme Court established "one of
the most important administrative law decisions in recent
memory"334 though there are also scholars who criticise the
decision.335 This criticism is directed at the use of the
"1 K.Starr, supra note 284, p.288
332 467 U. S • 837, 841 - 843
"3 467 U.S. 837, 841
334K.Starr, supra note 284, p.312
335see: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p. 352
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"traditional tools" because they can be used by the judges
to direct the decision and to receive a desired result.
4) requirements
a) availability of jUdicial review
As was discussed earlier336 there is the presumption of
reviewability which is favored especially by APA §§ 703,
704. Therefore if an agency takes a certain action this
action should be reviewable unless "(1) statutes preclude
judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law". 337 This presumption of reviewability was
strengthened by several Supreme Court decisions338 and other
federal court decisions339 so that unless there is clear and
convincing congressional intent expressed and visible in the
statute to preclude jUdicial review or unless there is "no
law to apply" there is the possibility to obtain jUdicial
review. Judicial review therefore is available in most cases
336 see supra PART III, 1) b), pp. 75 - 78
337 APA § 701 (a)
338 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967);
citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971)
39 Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, (D.C. Cir.1986)
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where the administrative agencies act towards individuals340)
unless otherwise stated in the statute.
b) standing
Main purpose of the law of standing is to avoid the misuse
of the jUdicial branch. The requirement of standing is
vaguely mentioned in APA § 702: "A person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review". The law of
standing therefore is necessary to distinguish between the
people who really have suffered a "legal wrong" and those
who just do not agree with the agency action or think that a
different action would be better. As the law of standing is
not enacted explicitly in a statute it has undergone several
changes. Not only have there been many changes but there
also have been different attitudes towards the requirements
of standing at the same time. 341.
340 this "general move" towards more protection of the
individual was very much favored (if not "founded") by the
Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly [397 U.S. 254,
90 S.ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed 2d 287 (1970)] which refused to
furtheron enforce the distinction between benefits and
privileges concerning protection given by the due process
clause
341. see: K.C.Davis, supra note 21, vOl.4, p. 208: "...main
failure of the law of standing is ... the inconsistency,
unreliability, and inordinate complexity"
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From the beginning on it was clear that the person who
wanted to take legal action had to be "adversely
affected".342 How this was to be defined though was not
clear. One of the Supreme Court's approaches towards the
requirements of standing was to demand that a legal right
was injured. 343If a legal right of the plaintiff was
violated he/she had standing. One of the problems of this
approach was that the person hurt through the agency action
had to show that the action was illegal. As there are not
always statutes - being a common law system - explicitly
authorizing and limiting agency actions the plaintiff had to
prove that the action was illegal though this action might
not have been held illegal before. 344Another approach was
the so called "private attorney general" doctrine that gave
standing to persons who wanted to assert a public
interest.345
342a thorough and general chapter to the history and
evolution of the law of standing: K.C. Davis, supra note 21,
vol. 4, pp. 230 - 235
343Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 44 S.ct. 317,
68 L.Ed. 667 (1924); Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T.V.A.,
306 U.S. 118, 59 S.ct. 366, 83 L.Ed.543 (1939)
344see: K.C.Davis, supra note 21, vol. 4, p.232
345Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p. 134/135; see
e.g.: Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.ct. 1942,
20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)
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And though these two attempts to establish a useful law of
standing probably have been the most important, they only
have been two of several attempts. 346 The law of standing
used today was invented and established in the Supreme
Court's decision in Association of Data Processing Service
organizations, Inc. v. Camp347 and to a certain degree can be
seen as a mixture of these two earlier approaches towards
standing.
In this decision the Supreme Court developed a two step
approach to find out whether the plaintiff has standing or
not. The Court required that a party has to have (i) an
injury in fact which must be (ii) "within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
consti tutional guarantee in question". 348 This two step
approach is a clearly defined standard but there
nevertheless still remain questions concerning the law of
standing which are answered only slowly through following
Supreme Court decisions.
The requirement of an "injury in fact" is of course
necessary because without an injury there is no "case or
346 William A. Fletcher, "The Structure of Standing",
98 Yale L.J. 221,224-229 (1988)
347397 U.S. 150, 90 S.ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970)
348 397 U.S . 150, 153
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controversy" .349The injury in fact can be an economic,
aesthetic, conservational or recreational injury. with this
decision the Court therefore turned away from the
requirement of the "legal injury" though of course the
plaintiff still has to have a legal right to jUdicial
enforcement of an asserted legal duty. 350The injury that is
complained about has to be caused by the "illegal ,,351action
of the administrative agency which the plaintiff tries to
have declared void. The judicial decision that is seeked
must be capable of remedying the injury352 and the plaintiff
of course has to be among the individuals injured by the
agency's action. This injury may even be a "procedural
injury'P53 what means that if procedural rights of the
plaintiff are hurt and he/she receives an injury through
this the requirements of the "injury in fact" are fulfilled.
The second requirement is fulfilled if the injury is within
the zone of interests of the respective statute or even
349Maria E.Mansfield, "Standing and Ripeness Revisited: the
Supreme Courts 'Hypothetical Barriers''', 68 N.D.L.Rev. 1,
p 26 (1992)
300W.Fletcher, supra note 346,221,229
351the action which is claimed to be illegal
3~ Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 93 S.ct. 1146,
35 L.Ed. 2d 536 (1973)
353Nancy S. Grief, "Where Do We Stand Now?",
33 Nat. Resources J. 507, p.2 (1993)
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355 W.Fletcher, supra note 346, 221,258
enough to establish standing. 356
standing to sue in their own right", the interests at stake
they establish standing if "its members would otherwise have
no individual participation is necessary. 357
356 see esp.: united states v. students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (S.C.R.A.P.), 412 U.S. 669,
93 S.ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed. 2d 254 (1973)
354 "the test is not meant to be especially demanding",
Clarke v. securities industry Association, 479 U.S. 388,
107 s.ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971)
are interests that comply with the associations purpose and
357 Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising commission,
432 U.S. 333, 97 S.ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977)
When associations want to sue on behalf of their members
injury in fact it has found that the proof of the injury was
injury in fact.355 In cases where the court only examined the
supreme Court often only focused on the first step, the
in the respective case is a "duty" after Data processing the
Though to find out whether the zone of interest does exist
certain issue354 which is questioned is the specif ic case.
whether the respective statute's intent is to protect the
within a constitutional guarantee. statutory language as
well as legislative intent have to be questioned to find out
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c) timing
To avoid the abuse of the jUdicial branch the plaintiffs do
not only have to have standing and a "case,P58 but other
requirements also have to be fulfilled. The main purpose of
these requirements is not to avoid an abuse of the jUdicial
branch but to ensure that the dispute between the individual
and the agency has not been settled after certain
administrative procedures and requirements have been
obtained and therefore can only be solved by the jUdicial
branch. These requirements are fulfilled if the agency made
a final decision, all administrative remedies have been
exhausted and the court therefore can not interfere with the
decisionmaking process of the agency.
(aa) One of the requirements that has to be fulfilled before
the court reviews the action is that the case has to be
"ripe". The law of ripeness is a judge - made law and may be
seen as an outflow of the "case or controversy" requirement
of art. 111.359 The law of ripeness' aim is to avoid giving
advisory opinions. This judge - made law has undergone
several changes since its "creation" .360The requirement that
a case has to be ripe before there can be a trial before a
3~ Art III of the u.s. Constitution
3M K.C.Davis, supra note 39, p.82
~o a case reflecting the "ripeness - doctrine" in "earlier
days": International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S.
222, 74 S.ct. 447, 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954)
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court is fulfilled if an official position of an
administrative agency bears the danger to harm individuals
severely.361 Therefore the "present law of ripeness is based
on a proper balance between the need for concerning jUdicial
resources and the need for relieving private parties from
debili tating uncertainties". 362The change towards this
understanding of the law of ripeness was made in Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner.363 In its general statement about
ripeness the Court stated: "[I]ts basic rationale is to
prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies, and also to
protect the agencies from jUdicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects
felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties" .364In
this decision the Supreme Court "invented" a two step test
to find out whether a case is ripe or not. The controversial
issue has to be "fit" for review and the "hardship to the
parties withholding court consideration"365 has to be
3D K.C. Davis, supra note 39, p.82
362K.C.Davis, supra note 21, vol. 4, p.410
363387 U.S . 136 (1967)
364387 U.S. 136, 149
365387 U.S. 136, 149
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considered. Though it might be difficult to determine when a
case is "fit" - Justice Harlan writing for the Court found
that the question at issue concerned a "purely legal
question of statutory construction "366where only research
into Congress' intent was necessary and that the action at
issue was final in the sense of APA § 704. Therefore
"fitness of the issue" and the possible "hardship to the
affected"367 contain the answer to the question whether a
case is ripe or not.
(bb) A plaintiff seeking jUdicial review has to exhaust all
administrative remedies that are available in the specific
case before seeking relief in a federal court.368 An
important case dealing with the exhaustion of administrative
remedies was Myers v. Betlehem Shipbuilding Corp ..369In this
case the Supreme Court held that a court may not enjoin
administrative proceedings on a complaint before the
366Robert C. Powell, "Help is Sometimes Close at Hand: The
Exhaustion Problem and the Ripeness SOlution",
1987 U.III.L.Rev. 547, 600 (1987)
3n 387 U.S. 136, 149
368Sonya Gidumal, "McCarthy v. Madigan: Exhaustion of
Administrative Agency Remedies and Bivens",
7 Admin.L.J.Am.U. 373 (1993)
369303 U.S. 41, 58 S.ct . 459, 82 L.Ed . 638 (1938)
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administrative remedies were exhausted even is the plaintiff
claimed that the agency would lack jurisdiction to act. 370
Reasons for this exhaustion requirement are the separation
of powers doctrine and to establish an independent
administrative agency which is able to correct its own
mistakes and will be oriented to have an efficient process
as well as to preserve jUdicial economy. 3n
In its decision in McKart v. united States372 the Supreme
Court stated several reasons for the requirement of
exhaustion.373 In this decision the Court stated that if
there is the possibility to use administrative remedies and
these possibilities are not used by the plaintiff - he/she
may not raise issues before a court that he/she could have
discussed and possibly could have solved with the agency.
Though the exhaustion doctrine may be similar to the
requirement of APA § 704 that a legal action can only be
taken against a final agency action there are differences in
purpose and proceeding.
370 303 U.S. 41, 47
3n a detailed discussion of those reasons: Marcia R.
Gelpe, "Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from
Environmental Cases", 53 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1, 11 - 25 (1985)
372395 U.S. 185, 89 S.ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969)
373 see: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, pp. 177/178
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(cc) According to APA § 704 the action against which the
plaintiff seeks to take legal action must be a final agency
action. Reason for this is to avoid interferences of the
judicial branch with the administrative agencies. Though
this is one of the reasons for the doctrine of the
"exhaustion of administrative remedies" the damages that
might occur when a court interferes with an agency's
decisionmaking process are much more severe. The exhaustion
doctrine gives agencies the possibility to review and to
rethink their decisions and to change them if they think it
is necessary or advisable. If a court interferes it will
"only" control the legality of that action which it will do
anyway sooner or later whereas if it decides instead of the
agency it substitutes its opinion for that of a part of the
executive branch. The determination whether an agency action
is final or not usually is not difficult. Difficulties and
problems may arise though when a "failure to act" or a
"rejection to act" are concerned. In Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Hardin374 the D.C. Circuit held that in very
urgent and important cases or in cases where otherwise an
irretrievable injury might be received jUdicial review can
be available before a final agency action was issued. "When
administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on the
rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot
preclude judicial review by casting its decision in the form
374 428 F.2d 1093, 138 U.S. App. 391 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
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of inaction rather than an order denying relief".3~ In
another "trendsetting" decision376 in Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus377 the D.C. Circuit ordered the
agency to take a certain action instead of postponing the
decision. This of course is a questionable intervention as
it may interfere with certain constitutional and democratic
requirements and guidelines but this intervention has been
defended with the "public health hazards" that were at
stake. 378
d) primary jurisdiction
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a court made
doctrine and concerns the question whether a court may
decide about a certain topic or whether this question should
375D.C. Circuit, cited from PiercejShapirojVerkuil, supra
note 24, p.171
376though the decisions of the D.C. Circuit are favorable
and "trendsetting" in this particular area of administrative
law they nevertheless seem to be the only one putting much
more weight on the danger of possible harm for individuals
than on strict statutory obedience
n7 439 F. 2d 584, 142 U.S. App. D.C. 74(D.C. Circuit 1971)
378as was mentioned supra in PART III B) c): "Discretionary
power not to take action is power to discriminate",
K.C.Davis, supra note 219; the problem that arises though
is: once orders like this are allowed (even if the interests
at stake may "justify" the action) - can this case be
distinguished in an objective and neutral manner from other
cases where this should not be allowed?
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be dealt with by the agency. 379The primary jurisdiction is
used especially "for withholding judicial power in order to
make place for the agency". 380Therefore this concept is used
by courts to "allocate initial decision making
responsibility"~1 between an agency and a court. If it is a
whole dispute that is in question with the primary
jurisdiction the court will dismiss the case whereas if it
only is a certain issue the court will wait until the agency
has spoken to the issue. Of course the primary jurisdiction
is not concerned with final decisions but only with initial
determinations. A court will dismiss the dispute because of
primary jurisdiction because of the expertise of the
agency382 and to achieve a uniform treatment of the specific
issue. As different courts may make different decisions the
agency dealing with the issue will establish a uniform
standard. Main use of the primary jurisdiction is within the
anti trust law. 383In the most important decision concerning
379to primary jurisdiction in general:
Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, pp. 190 - 194
380K.C. Davis, supra note 21, vol.4, p.82
3D Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p. 190
382in a common law country the judge shall be a
"generalist" and therefore he/she defers to the agency's
expertise and special knowledge, see supra PART I,
introduction
~3 R.C.Davis, supra note 21, vOl.4, pp. 100 - 119
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primary jurisdiction, in United states v. Western Pacific
Railroad CO.384, the Supreme Court stated that "[N]o fixed
formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. In every case the question is whether the
reason for the existence of the doctrine are present and
whether the purposes it serves will be aided by its
application in the particular litigation". As there is no
"fixed formula" the judges must decide from case-to-case
whether the agency shall decide the topic first or whether
the court can decide.
384352 U.S. 59, 77 S.ct. 161, 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956)
PART IV
HISTORIC AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON THE AMERICAN AND GERMAN
LEGAL SYSTEMS AND THE JUDICIAL REVIEW
1) source of the law
History and the experiences with different political and
legal systems have had a great influence on the
establishment and realization of the american and german
legal systems in general and especially concerning the
judicial review of administrative action.
Besides other reasons the war of independence was fought to
get rid of a political system in which only a few non -
elected persons ruled country and society. Instead of always
having the duty to obey the "sovereign" the people wanted to
establish a society/community in which the members could
develop and express personal opinions of their own. To
achieve personal freedom not only in verbal expressions was
one of the main goals. Not a regulated and standardized
system but the people's will was thought to be the most
important content establishing a free society.
As the people's will may change the framers of the
Constitution adopted the common law system which was thought
to reflect the people's will better than a civil law system.
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As a result of this many requirements and necessities to
obtain judicial review - and especially to obtain it
successfully - have been developed and invented by the
Supreme Court. As the Justices of the Court are appointed by
the elected head of the executive branch they - at least to
a certain extent - often resemble the majority of the
people's opinions on certain issues. The jUdge-made-law
(combined with the jury system) therefore often reflects the
people's view. Of course this "reflection" does not reach
the explicit words of the law but at least to the extent
whether something should be viewed in a "liberal" and
"broad" or "conservative" and "narrow" sense the people's
opinion often is reflected to some extent in the Court's
opinions.
Enacting the Grundgesetz the fathers of the Constitutions
main aim was to establish a legal system which could not be
abused in any way, either by an (possibly) influenced
majority or through the government.385 Being a civil law
country there is no judge-made-Iaw but only law enacted by
the German Bundestag386 and the German Bundesrat. 387
385 see esp.: E.Schmidt Assmann, supra note 2, pp.995 - 998;
K.Stern, supra note 15, p.19
386 "House of Representatives"
387 " Senate"
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Though the representatives of the Bundestag are elected
persons the voters do not have a thorough influence on their
representatives and the laws they will enact. When the
Grundgesetz was enacted the "fathers" of the Constitution
wanted that all state authority388 "shall be exercised by the
people by means of elections and voting ...".389 To give
parties a constitutional right to participate in the
political process390 they "shall participate in the forming
of the political will of the people". 391 The existence of
parties was constitutionally guaranteed as forums to express
and realize the people's will. Nowadays the people's
influence on their representatives and on the law is less
than just "vague" because there has been an evolutionary
change from a liberal and representative democracy to a
system where the representatives are elected because of
their membership to a certain party and not because of their
ideas and ideals. People vote for a certain party because
388 which of course is something different than and does not
include the abstract purpose of the "rule of law"; the state
authority can only be exercised within the legal (and moral)
boundaries of the rule of law
3~ GG art. 20 (2)
390 this is one of the lessons from the "third Reich" where
the only party allowed was the NSDAP and therefore a
different "political organ" to express political opinions
was missing and the free expression of course did not exist
391 GG art. 21 (1)
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they believe that this respective party reflects the same
concepts of values on certain things392 as they do. The
membership to a certain party then "orders" the elected
representative to vote within the "party discipline"393 and
not because he/she wants to represent the interests of
his/her voters. This "party - discipline" is understandable
and necessary at least to a certain extent: though the
Chancellor is not an "officer" of the Bundestag the majority
of the Bundestag nevertheless can withdraw their support
from the Chancellor. As the Chancellor is elected by the
members of the Bundestag the Bundestag also can make a vote
of non - confidence and discharge the Chancellor. This means
that the Chancellor (different than the U.S. President) does
have to have the support of the majority of the Bundestag.
To support the Chancellor394 the members of the respective
party to a certain degree have to vote within the party -
discipline. Though to a certain degree the source of the law
can be seen as the people's will expressing their
conservative or liberal preferences while voting for the
Bundestag the main source or the law is the legislator's (or
negative: the party's) will. This is a good reflection
392which means that they vote "conservative", "liberal" or
"social democratic" and not because one representative
thinks different about a certain issue than another
393see: supra p. 3; H. Steinberger, supra note 4, p. 128
394who in usually is the head of the respective party
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though of the believe that in a civil law country not the
majority of the people make the law but only the
representati ves395 because not a subjective opinion but an
abstract principle of justice shall be the source of the
law.
As a source of law the people's will therefore has a quite
significant influence in the United states' legal system
whereas in Germany the people's will is not important as a
source of the law.
2) aim and purpose of the law
As was mentioned above one of the aims of the war of
independence was to change the political system and the
influence the people had on decisions concerning society.
The answer and opposite political system to the British
monarchy was the liberal democracy where the majority's will
is the main order. "We the people .••" therefore does not
only mean that the people do establish the community but
395 this attitude towards the law changed during the
years though; people now often believe that they should have
more "rights" to determine the law and influence on how the
law should be; in some state constitutions there is the
possibility that if a certain percentage of the state
inhabitants want a certain law the state legislator has to
discuss and vote about this proposal; also in most of the
states there is the possibility for plebiscites on certain
issues; these two possibilities luckily do not exist on the
federal level
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also that the people's will is the main source of the law
and the legal system.396
As a response to the history the u.s. law shall serve the
people and shall therefore represent and reflect the
people's will. Though nobody will deny that to achieve
justice in an abstract sense surely is one purpose of the
law it is not the purpose of the legal system. The common
law and the case by case system serves the individual
consideration and not an abstract principle.
Though the Constitution of the Weimarer Republic was a
democratic Constitution it was possible to transform the
democratic republic into a totalitarian country ruled by a
dictator. Enacting the "eternity clause" in GG art. 79 (3)
the fathers of the Grundgesetz ensured that the democratic
system as such could not be transformed or changed.
~o furthermore avoid the possibility of uncontrolled
arbitrary decisions of sovereign acting agencies/civil
servants the aim of the fathers of the Grundgesetz was to
establish a legal system in which the rule of law should be
the most important and most central constitutional demand.
396 Hamilton, Madison and Jay thought that the separation of
powers and elections of the representatives would be enough
to establish justice and freedom, see: W. Brugger, supra
note 1., p.22/23; they did not intend to enact civil rights
as they thought the people's will would be reasonable enough
and the enactment of the Constitution would be a significant
sign itself
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Therefore the enacted laws serve the abstract principle of
the rule of law39" and is not necessarily enacted to respond
to the people's will and demand. 398 The law of course is not
only enacted to serve the rule of law as an abstract
principle but as the law should serve the community and the
individual the Grundgesetz tries to protect the community
and the individual living in it and not necessarily the
subjective will of the individuals forming the community.
As a part of the legal system the judicial review of
administrative actions is primarily oriented to serve the
abstract justice and not necessarily the individual justice.
397 though there are several different opl.nl.onsconcerning
the question which requirements constitute the "rule of law"
principle the main features are established in several
articles of the Grundgesetz (e.g. separation of powers,
democracy); what is controversial nowadays only is the
extent to which certain values represented by the rule of
law can be or shall be stretched and expanded; this
especially concerns "social obligations" and "guarantees of
equality" of the government which some scholars think to be
connected closely with the principle of the rule of law (but
which should be a question concerning the extent of the
"social state principle" which also is a requirement of the
Constitution); GG art 20 (1): "The Federal Republic of
Germany is a democratic and social federal state"; to the
content and extent of the "social federal state" see:
R.Herzog, "Die Verfassungsentscheidung fuer die
sozialstaatlichkeit", pp.295 - 326, in : Maunz/Duerig, supra
note 17
398 as mentioned above the possibility that the proposal of
an abstract principle may oppose or even harm individuals is
accepted, see supra pp.1/2; E. Schmidt Assmann, supra
note 2, p.1030
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The differences between the purpose of the law therefore is
quite significant between the american and the german legal
systems.
3) different attitudes towards the government and
administrative agencies
The differences in the historical and cultural attitudes
towards and the development of the source and aims and
purpose of the law of the respective country also reflects a
different attitude towards the government and the
administrative agencies that represent the sovereign power.
In the United states there is the common believe that the
government should be "small" and without much influence and
control over the daily routine and society. This is a
response to the historic experiences with different
pOlitical systems399 and expresses the established believe
that "liberty" should be the main feature of this society.
Liberty not only in a "negative" meaning and as a defense
399 though the declaration of independence was made to
establish a liberal democracy as a response to the British
monarchy many "Americans" came to this continent after the
war of independence was over; they wanted to evacuate from
the respective country and political system which not
necessarily had to be a monarchy but which in most cases
surely had a severe influence on the "individual liberties"
of their inhabitants; the "small government" on one side and
the possibility of liberty and individualism On the other
side therefore certainly have been very important reasons
for many people to come to the United states
144
against governmental regulation and "control" but also in a
positive sense as a realization and proposal of the self -
responsibility. When the influence and exercise of power of
a government should be as small as possible it is necessary
to have as few laws as possible.
In Germany it is to the contrary. It is thought that the
government should have a strong influence upon the society.
Throughout the last ten centuries Germany has always been a
country in which there has been a strong sovereign authority
in which people believed and where lots of laws regulated
the society. 400 Though the common believe in a strong
sovereign authority still is quite widespread the sceptizism
and awareness of its actions nevertheless increased because
of the disasters in the recent history. 401 As a response to
this deprivation not sUbjective interests but an abstract
justice should be guaranteed through the Constitution as
well as the constitutional guarantee of an efficient
jUdicial protection against sovereign actions. Though the
government has a strong influence on society there is the
possibility to take legal action against each action that
may harm subjective rights of the individuals.
400 one of the first books where the law was codified was
the "Sachsenspiegel", written ca. 1224 - 1233
401 the deprivation of the law, the genocide and the
degeneration of the political system have been enforced by
the "government" and within their authority (though of
course this was not a legally and democratic confirmed
authority)
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This was thought to be a mixture of an organizing, providing
and regulating government on one side and the ensurance of
justice on the other side. To the same extent as it is much
more difficult in a big country like the u.s. to have a
thorough influence on all citizens in a small country like
Germany with many inhabitants it is a necessity for the
government to regulate and organize society and the life in
the community. Also as an answer to the history the fathers
of the german constitution tried to ensure that the
executive could not act just the way it wanted to. Therefore
they invented a narrow "checks and balance" - system as the
Chancellor is elected by the Bundestag and also can be
discharged by the members of the Bundestag. Enacting this
system the fathers of the Grundgesetz tried to avoid very
strong and independent branches but as they are connected
and dependent from each other the legislative and the
executive branch should control each other and should be
forced to find democratic compromises in difficult
situations.
The american President as the head of the executive is
widely uncontrolled and not responsible to Congress. He can
only be discharged by impeachment and he is not dependable
on any other branch. This very strict realization of the
separation of powers is balanced by the system of "checks
and balances" enacted in the Constitution. As the President
is very independent in his decisions and attitudes towards
the solution of certain problems he therefore is relatively
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free on how he "executes the laws". The administrative
agencies very often are enacted to solve certain problems
and to help the President to execute the laws. As they shall
help the President and not Congress to execute the laws they
have to execute the laws the way the President thinks is the
politically correct one. Though several agencies
administrate the relationships between the sovereign and the
citizens (like e.g. the Social Security Administration) most
of the agencies are a part of the political process. As they
are a part of the executive and the political process they
of course have to have discretion dealing with the topics
they are enacted to administrate and problems they shall
solve. Therefore the enacting statutes delegate broad
discretionary authority to the respective agency so that the
executive can fulfill their tasks in the way they think is
the correct one. Very significant is the fact that an
organic act usually authorizes an agency to e.g. take care
of a certain problem without stating that the agency shall
take care that this certain problem should be solved. 402
This is to the contrary in Germany where the agencies only
execute the laws. Though they do have discretionary power
this discretionary power exists only concerning factual
402 as was mentioned above there is a big difference
concerning this "authorization" between american and german
agencies: the german agency's duty is stated in the
respective statute so that a citizen may derive an
entitlement from the respective statute against the agency
to act in a certain desired way (if the legal and factual
requirements are fUlfilled)
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questions. As the agencies in Germany do not take part in
the political process there is not the necessity to delegate
broad discretionary authority.
PART V
COMPARISON OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A) Differences in the Judicial Review
1) review of which agency actions
a) agency actions
Almost all administrative actions are reviewable in the u.s.
and Germany. In Germany GG art. 19 (4) ensures that there is
an efficient protection against sovereign actions. Judicial
review of administrative actions therefore may be obtained
against adjudications, administrative acts and statutes.
There is no judicial review against laws enacted by the
German Bundestag but if there is an administrative act
enacted because of this law and a person takes legal action
against this administrative act the law as a basis for the
agency's action will be controlled incidently. 403 Excluded
403 but as laws are enacted by the German Bundestag and not
by administrative agencies the specific review of laws is
not a part of this thesis
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from jUdicial review404 are discretionary actions of the
administrative agencies. As the german legal system
primarily obeys the rule of law the only thing which is
important concerning the availability of judicial review is
whether a subjective right of the plaintiff may be harmed
through the agency action and not which type of action the
agency chose.
In the U.S. legal system there is a presumption of
reviewability of administrative action.4~ This presumption
of reviewability of the APA was strengthened by several
Supreme Court decisions - especially by the Abbott Lab. v.
Gardner decision. The presumption of reviewability can be
rebutted though if the review is precluded by statute406 or
if the agency acted within its discretionary power.407 Though
the Court found that the "committed to agency discretion"
exception is a very narrow one408 the cases where the agency
acts within its discretionary power and therefore these
actions are not reviewable may occur quite often as Congress
usually delegates broad discretionary authority to the
404at least to some extent, see following pages A) c)
405see supra p. 74
406APA § 701 (a) (1)
407APA § 701 (a) (2)
~8 see supra p.75; 401 U.S. 402,410
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agencies.409 Therefore though there is the "presumption of
reviewability"410 in the u.s. nevertheless the percentage of
the actions reviewable may differ between the two legal
systems. This may be as more statutes in the u.s. authorize
agencies to act with discretionary power than in Germany.
The difference therefore is that though most administrative
actions of the agencies in the u.s. are reviewable this is
only a presumption which can be rebutted whereas the
possibility to review all administrative actions is a
constitutional demand and is guaranteed through GG art 19(4)
in Germany.
b) agency inaction?
concerning an agency's refusal to act the Supreme Court
established a "presumption of unreviewability".41.1 This
presumption of unreviewability has its main foundation in
the respective statute which usually authorizes the agency
to do certain things but which seldom requires the agency to
do explicitly mentioned things. This, too, is a sign for the
participation of the administrative agencies at the
political process. If an agency would be required to fulfill
409this is necessary as the agencies are a part of the
political process; see supra pp. 15-18; M.Strobel, supra
note 35, 1321
410except those mentioned in APA § 701 (a)
41.1470 U.S. 821,831
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explicitly ordered things the political decision making
process would be disturbed. This presumption of
unreviewability can be rebutted if the respective statute
demands a certain action of the agency and if the court
therefore has a "meaningful standard" with which the action
can be controled. An inaction is reviewable therefore if a
person suffers a legal wrong through the inaction, if the
inaction is not totally committed to agency discretion and
if the refusal to act is a final agency action.412
In Germany there is no such "presumption of unreviewability"
of an agency's refusal to act. On the contrary there are
several types of lawsuits which are used to enforce a
certain desired but rejected administrative agency action;
the Verpflichtungsklage and the allgemeine Leistungsklage
(action for performance). With these two lawsuits courts can
control whether the agency had a duty to act in the
requested way. As all administrative agency actions are
reviewable and as it is known that inaction may cause the
same damage as an action the legislator had the
constitutional obligation to ensure that there is a chance
to review all agency actions and refusals to act,
GG art. 19 (4).413 Most important is that the plaintiff
4U see supra p. 87
413 see supra p. 20; see; K.C.Davis, supra note 219
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states in a plausible way that his/her subjective rights414
may be harmed through the agency's refusal to act.
Courts of course have to have a meaningful standard to
review the agency inaction. This standard usually is
provided by the enacting statute of the agency unless the
agency has discretion to decide whether it will act or
whether it will not act.
c) discretionary actions
VwGO § 114 empowers german courts to review the legality and
the expediency of an agency action if the agency made a
discretionary decision. A court will examine whether an
agency made a decision based on facts that do not exist,
whether an agency made a decision thinking that there are
certain limits of the discretionary power while these limits
do not exist, whether the agency made an arbitrary decision
and whether the agency really used its discretion or whether
the agency instead of that just followed the "usual
routine".4u If none of these "mistakes" occurred and the
agency's action is within the statutory boundaries and
statutory orders the court of course has to and will defer
to the agency's decision. Even if one of those "mistakes"
was made and the agency therefore did not act within its
414see supra p.55
4U see supra p.22
153
legal boundaries the lawsuit of the plaintiff will be
successful only if a subjective right of the plaintiff is
hurt through the illegal decision.416
One of the differences is that the organic acts in the
american system do delegate broad discretionary power to the
agencies as they are not only executing the law but also
fulfilling political aims, whereas in Germany discretionary
power delegated to the administrative agencies is very
limited because they only execute the law.
The american court has to review the discretionary actions
and has to find out whether it was "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with
law".417 An abuse of discretion occurs if the agency
considered an irrelevant factor, if the agency failed to
consider a relevant factor, if the agency decided without
sufficient evidence or if the agency had given improper
weight to a relevant factor.418 These four factors are almost
the same as those in the german law. There therefore is not
a big difference in the possibility to review discretionary
actions. In both legal systems the discretionary action
itself is unreviewable except for arbitrariness and excess
of statutory authorization. If constitutional rights are
416see: W. Schmitt Glaeser, supra note 49, p. 99
417APA § 701 (2)(A )
418see: M. Shapiro, supra note 200, p.1490
154
may not declare the law unconstitutional. If a court finds
tasks helping the President to execute the laws.
see: Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p. 129
discretionary action. The reviewing court in Germany can and
make an unconstitutional decision the court has to pass the
lawsuit to the Federal Constitutional Court because the
involved courts in the U.S. may review the discretionary
action419, too. Many plaintiffs in Germany claim that their
constitutional rights have been hurt through the
will examine whether the affected interests have been
weighed and balanced in the correct manner. As long as there
is a legal basis discretionary decision courts in Germany
that there is a legal basis which authorizes the agency to
privilege to declare a law unconstitutional is a right which
is reserved solely to the Federal Constitutional Court.
examine the expediency of the discretionary choice of the
The extent of jUdicial review differs as german courts may
agency, VwGO § 114.420 What is different, too, is that there
are more statutes delegating discretionary power to U.S.
administrative agencies which is necessary to fulfill their
419
420 because of the separation of powers the courts of course
will defer to the agency's decision unless there occurred a
severe misjudgment in weighing and balancing the situation
and interests at stake
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2) differences in the admissibility?
What is the same in both legal systems is the fact that
courts may not require more or stricter procedural
requirements than the legislator does. The APA establishes
Itmaximum" procedural requirements which Congress was willing
to have courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking
procedures" •421 Agencies are free to grant more procedural
participation - rights if they wish to but courts may not
demand them. The VwVfG and the VwGO contain the procedural
participation rights an agency has to offer. Courts have to
control whether all of those procedural participation -
rights have been offered and obeyed but they may not require
different or more procedural participation rights.
a) distinction between admissibility and success
Both legal systems make a distinction between the
admissibility and the examination of the merits of a case.
The judge first has to examine whether the plaintiff has
standing, whether the action is reviewable and whether the
plaintiff exhausted the administrative remedies. There is a
difference though deriving from the origins of the two legal
systems: being a civil law system all requirements necessary
to obtain judicial review are enacted in legislative laws
whereas - being a common law country - some necessities in
421 PiercejShapirojVerkuil, supra note 24, p. 175
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the u.s. legal system are jUdge-made-Iaw, like e.g. the law
of ripeness and the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Though
the origins of the requirements which have to be fulfilled
to obtain jUdicial review differ in the two legal systems
they do have the same purpose and try to achieve the same
goal. These requirements serve to avoid the abuse of the
legal system which would take place if the judges would have
to examine the legal questions of cases where the plaintiffs
would not be the addressees of the action and had no
standing and would not be affected by the action at all.
These requirements therefore are necessary to protect the
judicial branch against "improper plaintiffs".
b) standing and subjective rights
In the u.s. the plaintiff has to have standing where the
judge examines whether the plaintiff is affected by the
administrative action and suffered a "legal wrong" through
that action. In the german legal system the plaintiff has to
be the addressee of (or at least: has to be affected by) the
administrative action and he/she has to state in a plausible
way that his/her sUbjective rights have been harmed through
the agency action.
The Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff has to have (i) an
injury in fact which must be (ii) "within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
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constitutional guarantee in question". 422The sUbjective
right as it is understood in Germany is almost the same as
the two step inquiry of the Supreme Court. In both
requirements there has to be a legal basis which gives
certain rights not only to the community but also to the
individuals. The plaintiff then has to be among those
persons whom this statute wishes to protect or to whom it
wants to attach a right. Whereas the examination whether the
plaintiff has a subjective right is quite strict in
Germany423 the examination in the american system "is not
meant to be especially demanding". 424
c) exhaustion of administrative remedies
As the plaintiffs in Germany in certain lawsuits have to
obtain a pretrial review within the administrative agency
the same is true concerning the exhaustion of administrative
remedies in the u.S. legal system. In Germany a lawsuit will
422397 U.S. 150, 153
423 possibly because the question whether the plaintiff has
a subjective right is more important concerning the
protection of interests: if there is a subjective right
which may be hurt the individual is more important than the
agency decision, if there is no subjective right a lawsuit
will not be successful even if the action of the agency
should be illegal
424479 U.S . 38B; this may be as in most cases the agency has
discretion so that the main restriction of review will be in
the examination whether the action is reviewable or
unreviewable
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not be admissed if a pretrial proceeding is required but has
not been obtained by the plaintiff. 425 In the U.s. a lawsuit
will be admitted even if the administrative remedies have
not been exhausted but issues which could have been
discussed and examined during the procedure of
administrative remedies will not be examined and accepted by
the court. 426 The exhaustion of administrative remedies and
the pretrial review are necessities to maintain the
separation of powers as courts should not interfere with the
decisionmaking process of the agencies and they furthermore
shall unburden the judicial branch Of all those lawsuits
that can be solved between the affected parties through
negotiations and additional participation.
d) the competent court
A necessity which is not required in the american legal
system is the question whether the respective lawsuit is
admissible to recourse to the administrative courts,
VwGO § 40 (1). This is not necessary in the U.S. as the
judicial branbh is not divided and concerned with different
legal topics. As the judicial branch is divided427 in Germany
each "branch" has to examine whether it has jurisdiction or
425 see supra p. 56
4~ see supra p. 127
4~ see supra pp. 6 - 10
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whether a different court is competent. If a lawsuit is
concerned mainly with criminal or labor law (with certain
administrative law impacts) an administrative law court may
not admit this lawsuit but instead has to dismiss it. An
american court will send the lawsuit to another court if the
plaintiff took legal action before the wrong court while a
german court simply will dismiss the lawsuit. Either the
attorney takes the legal action before the competent court
or there will be no legal action.
e) final agency actions?
APA § 704 requires that the action brought before a court is
a final agency action.428 A final agency action is required
to avoid interferences with the decisionmaking process of
the executive branch and to maintain the separation of
powers. Agency actions and decisions have to be final in
Germany, too, to be reviewable by an administrative court.
In contrast to the U.S. legal system there are exceptions
from that rule: if (i) an agency has not acted yet but has
acted in an illegal way before and will act in the same way
soon again and an irretrievable situation may occur through
this action and if (ii) the agency takes three months or
longer to make a decision or to answer a request. In these
cases the plaintiff may take legal actions respectively the
court may examine the lawsuits before a final agency action
4~ see supra pp. 127 - 129
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has been made. Final agency action is not required in these
cases as it is quite evident that the agency will act in a
harmful and illegal way or that it is not fulfilling their
tasks. with these two possibilities courts may "interfere"
with the agency decisionmaking process (though they only
either prevent an illegal action or help citizens to their
rights enacted in the VwGO). concerning the requirement of
finality the german legal system avoids its strict and
abstract system and instead of that puts more weight on the
individual case.
f) time limit to take legal action?
Obtaining judicial review in Germany the plaintiff has to
take care that he/she takes the legal action within one
month after the administrative agency acted, VwGO § 74.
Though this is not a requirement necessary for all lawsuits
it is a presupposition for some of the legal actions429,
especially for those where the agency and the addressee are
confronted with legally binding actions.
There is no rule concerning a certain period of time within
which a legal action must have been taken in the U.S •. The
addressee therefore may wait as long as he/she
wishes but there of course is the risk that the action will
429 for the Anfechtungsklage, the Verpflichtungsklage and the
Fortsetzungsfeststellungsklage, see supra pp. 59/60
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be executed and irretrievable if the legal action will be
obtain~d too late.
3) differences in the success?
a) different judicial branches
Though there is a big difference between the u.s. and german
legal systems considering the fact that there is a jUdicial
branch dealing only with administrative law in Germany - the
fact that there is this difference is the only fact which
can be mentioned here.
First of all this difference in the legal systems serves the
purpose of the law of the respective country and second the
there is no empirical data available concerning the
advantage, efficiency or success of the jUdicial review of
cases dealing with administrative law. As the u.s. law shall
serve the people it may not be too complex to serve this
purpose whereas the german law with the amount of different
things it tries to regulate is too complex to be judged in
an efficient way by one judge dealing with all legal
topics.430 All that can be said here therefore is that each
judicial branch serves the purpose of the legal system.
Another important difference is that the citizen in Germany
has a legal entitlement to have his/her lawsuit reviewed by
the Federal Constitutional Court if his/her constitutional
4~ see supra pp. 7-9
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guar~nteed rights possibly could be harmed through the
decision of the Federal Administrative Court which is the
court of last resort concerning administrative law. In the
u.s. there is no such legal entitlement to go to the Supreme
Court but this does not mean that there is less protection
or review available but only that the structure of the court
system is different and demands different tasks from the
"court of the last resort".
b) scope of review
Whereas in Germany all actions of an administrative agency
are jUdicial reviewable to the same extent no matter what
kind of action is involved there is a distinction in the
U.S. concerning the extent of judicial review and the kind
of action under review. As mentioned and explained431 a
german administrative court examines the formal and
objective legitimacy of the administrative actions to the
same extent concerning factual and legal questions
regardless whether the action is an administrative act or an
order or a rule. The extent of the jUdicial review of course
differs concerning the procedural requirements which can be
examined by a court as the different kind of actions have
varying procedural demands. This is not the same concerning
the review of administrative actions in the u.S. In the
american legal system courts make two distinctions:
4ll see supra pp. 64 - 67
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(i) courts have a different attitude examining the extent of
formal rulemaking and adjudication on one and informal
rUlemaking on the other side and (ii) courts make a thorough
distinction between the factual and the legal control of the
agency action. 432
to (i): Whereas the formal rulemaking and formal
adjudication are examined by the substantial evidence test
the APA does not require that the informal rulemaking has to
be examined by the substantial evidence test but only
whether it is arbitrary and capricious. 433 The organic act of
the respective agency sometimes requires that the informal
rulemaking has to be examined by the substantial evidence
test.434 Though enacting an informal rule the agency has to
obey certain procedural requirements435 the APA nevertheless
makes a distinction to the formal rulemaking where
procedural requirements are also required and puts the
informal rulemaking and the informal adjudication on one
side.
432 see supra p. 104
433 supra p. 110; R. Dolzer, supra note 27, p.589
434 Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p. 339
4~ see supra pp. 94/95
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As there is only a "brief explanation" required436 making an
informal adjudication there is no substantial standard upon
which a court could review.
to (ii): What is quite significant is the difference between
the two legal systems concerning the review of the
procedural requirements and the content of the respective
action.437 Because the main focus of the administrative
courts in Germany is the "subjective right" which might be
harmed they examine the legal and the factual issues. As in
the U.S. "due process of law" is a constitutional demand
courts primarily examine whether the procedural requirements
have been observed. Reviewing an agency decision courts
often defer to the special knowledge of the respective
agency not only concerning factual but sometimes also legal
questions.438 Therefore the american courts reviewing
administrative actions put more weight on their examination
of the observance of the procedural requirements whereas the
german courts examine the factual issues, too.
436 supra p. 105
437 see: R. Dolzer, supra note 27, p. 580; H. Jarass, supra
note 38, p. 383
438 H. Jarass, supra note 38, p. 386
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B) Reasons for those Differences
As has been mentioned and explained there are several
diff~rences concerning the judicial review of administrative
actions deriving from the historical developments and
cultural attitudes towards the political and legal systems.
The reasons for constructing the respective political system
are very much reflected in the realization of the
possibilities of judicial review of individuals against
actions of a sovereign acting authority. From what was
represented so far it is quite clear that the german legal
system tries to ensure an abstract justice for the community
of citizens whereas in the united states more weight is put
upon justice for the individual. 439
A very thorough and important influence on the system of
judicial review of both countries are the different purposes
and aims of the administrative agencies. Though the names
and sometimes even the assignments are quite similar the
purposes, aims and understanding of the tasks of
administrative agencies are quite different in the United
states and in Germany.
Whereas in both countries the administrative agencies
execute the laws agencies in Germany are "politically
439 this does not necessarily cover all requirements
concerning the judicial review of administrative
actions/inactions but this is true concerning the aim and
purpose of the legal system as such
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neutral" and agencies in the united states are "political
tools" of the executive branch. This is a very important
difference concerning the understanding and the realization
of the judicial review of administrative actions in both
countries. Helping the President to execute the laws
agencies have to have broad discretionary authority in
deciding how they will reach certain goals and fulfill
certain tasks.440 This participation in the political process
very often makes an administrative agency's action
unreviewable as the agencies have this very broad
discretionary power. In Germany administrative agencies do
not have discretionary power to the same extent which - as a
result - leads to a narrow and strict judicial review. This
"close" or "strict" judicial review is not only a result of
the fact that the agencies do not have very much
discretionary power but this is also an answer to historic
experiences to ensure that actions of an agency acting for
the sovereign power can be supervised.
The review of agency decisions, actions and inactions is
more extensive in Germany as all actions and inactions are
jUdicial reviewable and the agencies do not have very much
discretionary power.
Though there is the presumption of reviewability in the
united states this is only a presumption which can be
440 without broad discretionary power agencies would execute
the laws for Congress and not for the President
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rebutted so that there is not necessarily the possibility to
review an agency action. The same is true concerning the
judicial review of administrative inaction. While all
inactions can be reviewed in Germany there is the
presumption of unreviewability of inactions in the United
states. Concerning the reviewability or unreviewability of
agency inaction the organic statute of the agencies seem to
be the reason for the different attitudes towards the
review. While the organic act in Germany lists and defines
the respective agency's powers and especially the tasks it
has to fulfill the organic statutes in the United states
grant broad discretionary power to the agencies while
authorizing them to execute the laws without explicitly
ordering to do certain tasks.
In Germany an administrative agency has to fulfill explicit
orders of the legislator which can be enforced by
individuals if the respective statute the agency is dealing
with gives the individuals a subjective right while the
american agencies usually are enacted to solve a certain
national problem or to achieve a certain goal without
explicit standards about how the goal should be achieved.
Reason for these different attitudes is the fact that the
american administrative agencies are a part of the political
process whereas the german agencies are not a part of the
political process. Furthermore an extensive possibility to
obtain jUdicial review is guaranteed in Germany to
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correspond to the rule of law as the main principle of the
legal system.
As agency decision in the United states may contain
political contents courts are very likely to defer to agency
actions where the agency used discretion. Concerning
discretionary decisions the american courts very much are
"bound to legislative pOlicy decisions". 441
A significant problem for the courts in the United states
can be the difficulty to find out to what extent Congress
intended to delegate discretionary power to an agency. 442
While the use of discretionary power may be the exception in
Germany the search for the "law to apply" and a "meaningful
standard" can be main problems for an american court.
Regarding the differences between the two legal systems
concerning the timing of jUdicial review the historic
experiences and attitudes are very clear. Whereas in the
U.s. the strict obedience of the separation of powers is
most important443 in this situation the individual is the
441 Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, supra note 24, p. 115
40 see supra p. 81
443 as a response to the mingling of powers and the very
closely connected possibility of arbitrariness and injustice
as experienced with a monarchy and the various other
political systems from which the people fled
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most important object in the legal system in Germany.444
To avoid the possible interference with a different branch
courts in the u.s. review only final agency decisions
whereas german courts (responding to the constitutional
demand of an efficient protection445) do interfere with
administrative agencies to maintain certain conditions and
rights of the individuals.
The historical development and cultural attitudes towards
the jUdicial review are very clear, too, concerning the
scope of review. Whereas in Germany courts may review the
factual and the legal issues courts in the u.s. review the
legal questions. As the "due process of law" is a
constitutional demand courts examine whether the individual
has had the legally required procedures. The factual issues
are facts to which the courts in most cases defer to the
agencies special knowledge. The individual is responsible
for his actions and for the government the majority chose
and the jUdicial branch is responsible to guarantee a fair
procedure but not the contents of decisions having political
contents.
444to avoid the possibility that unjust or illegal sovereign
actions may cause an irretrievable situation; as a response
to the 3rd Reich there has to be the possibility to obtain
jUdicial review before it might be too late; see:
P. Kirchhof, supra note 102
445guaranteed through GG art 19 (4)
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As very many mistakes can be made because of wrong
judgements of factual issues courts in Germany do control
the factual issues and with that the sovereign power and its
obedience to the constitutional demands.
C) Conclusion
As was to be expected there are not only differences but
there are also similarities concerning the jUdicial review
of administrative actions in the american and the german
legal systems.
The differences correspond to the countries' historic
experiences and the different attitudes towards the
political system whereas the similarities correspond to the
general aim of the jUdicial review: the protection of the
individual and the democratic values.
What is very obvious is that the different attitudes towards
the respective political system are reflected in the
administrative agencies and the review of their actions.
"Learning by experience" seems to be what constitutes the
eminent differences between the two legal systems. The
different historic experiences cultivate the attitudes
towards the purpose of the political and legal systems.
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These systems are build to especially manifest the certainty
to avoid certain mistakes in the future that have been made
or experienced in the past.
One society establishes a political and legal system where
the individual is the main focus whereas the other
establishes a legal system to protect the democratic system.
While in Germany the main weight is put upon the strict and
correct appliance of the law the most important object in
the american legal system is the individual and his/her
personal freedom. The very strict use of the legal system in
Germany does not offer many possibilities to judge and
respect cases on an individual basis whereas in the u.s. the
consideration of the individual problem is very important.
Laws in Germany are enacted to serve the system while in the
U.S. the laws are enacted to serve the individual.
Also as a historical experience there is a very strict
obedience to the seperation of powers in the united states
whereas the executive and legislative branches are closely
connected in Germany. As a result of this and because they
are a part of the executive administrative agencies in the
United States fulfill different tasks than the german
agencies. Because of these different tasks individuals in
both countries are in different positions as addressee's of
administrative agencies actions. Whereas in Germany the main
focus of the agencies is the individual in the United states
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the addressee of agency actions very often is the general
public. This leads to different attitudes and necessities to
control the agency actions which are reflected in some of
the different requirements and possibilities of the jUdicial
control of the administrative agencies actions.
Though there are differences not only concerning the
judicial review but also the purpose of the administrative
agencies there nevertheless are similarities in the way the
legal systems try to achieve the main goals of the jUdicial
review: the protection of the individual and the control of
the powers.
APPENDIX:
1) Explanation of some German legal terms:
GG = german constitution (Grundgesetz)
the name Grundgestz and its formally correct translation
"Basic Law" aims at the intent of the "fathers" of the
constitution that this constitution sould be preliminary
until the country would be reunified and when the german
nation as a whole could enact a constitution. Therefore
they hesitated to name it "German Constitution" to
respect the feelings of the people who were not able to
enact a democratic constitution. Though "Basic Law" may
be the formal correct translation it does not reflect the
intent of the word "Grundgesetz". This name means that
this law will be the fundamental law, the foundation of a
new constitutional beginning.
After the reunification of Germany on October, 3rd 1990,
there was a commission of members of Parliament and
Senate evaluating wether new articles or changes on the
Grundgesetz would be necesary. This commission was
required by Art. 5 of the reunification - treaty of the
18.05.1990 between East- and West - Germany signed. This
commission - ending its work on July 1st, 1992 - came to
the conclusion that no new constitution or great changes
would have to be made (see the discussion of the result
of the commission: J.Isensee "Mit blauem Auge
davongekommen - das Grundgesetz" in: Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 1993,2583)
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BVerwGE = collection of the decisions of the BVerwG
ZPO = code of civil procedures (Zivilprozessordnung)
collection of the decisions of the BVerfG
VwVfG = general rules of the different possibilities in
which the administrative agency can act
BVerfG = Federal Constitutional Court [F.C.C.]
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) - the only court in
Germany whose decisions can be law, sec. 31 II
BVerfGG; this Court consists of two chambers, in each
chamber there are eight Justices; the Justices do not
have life tenure but are appointed for 12 years and
can not be appointed again
VwGO = rules of the administrative courts / legal
proceedings (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung)
BVerfGE
BVerwG = Federal Administrative Court
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht); this is the only federal
administrative court and the highest court deciding on
administrative law
BVerfGG = act that sets up the procedural rules,
requirements and structure for the Fed.Con.Court
(Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz)
VGH = higher administrative court, (Verwaltungsgerichtshof);
in some states the higher administrative court is called
Oberlandesgericht (OLG)
Verwaltungsgericht = administrative court (VG); the
"lowest" court dealing with administrative law
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admissibility = wether a lawsuit is successful depends on
two questions: the first part is a formal
examiniation where the judges examine wether a
legal right of the plaintiff could be hurt,
whether standing, timing and exhaustion are
fulfilled, in short, whether the plaintiff has
the right to sue; in the second step the merits
of the case are examined; the first step is
called admissibility .(Zulaessigkeit)
success = legally justified claim; a lawsuit is successful
if the examination of the merits of the case proove that
either the agency hurt a legally guaranteed right of the
plaintiff or if the plaintiff has a legal right to demand a
certain action of the administrative agency
provisional judicial review = especially because of the
rule of law - GG art 20 (3) - and the principle of the
efficiency of the protection by law - GG art 19 (4) - the
german parliament enacted rules ,- sec. VwGO 80,80a,123,
47 (8) - which make it possible for plaintiffs to achieve a
quick provisional/interlocutory judgement if it is
necessary to prevent a severe damage when the "usual"
judicial relief would take too long to guarantee an
efficient protection of the endangered guaranteed right.
preventive jUdicial review = this remedy is not explicitly
written down in the VwGO but is a requirement of
GG art 19 (4) and the principle of the efficient
protection by law and tries to protect a special legal
interest [BVerfGE 40, 323,326] which is endangered if
an agency would enact a certain impending act or rule
Vorverfahren = (pretrial review) most remedies (except
those that explicitly require an instant jUdicial
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relief or where the statute does not require a
pretrial review) require that the citizen who wants
to take legal action files a complaint at the
administrative agency against which the citizen plans
to take legal action, VwGO § 68 (1).
Different than in the US administrative agencies
there is no Administrative Law Judge but the
"ordinary" civil servants try to solve or reject the
complaint.
During this pretrial review of the administrative
agency the act, order or rule may not be implemented
or enforced, VwGO sec. 80,80a.
Allgemeines Rechtsschutzbeduerfnis = legitimate interest to
take legal action; necessary as a prohibition of the misuse
of procedural rights (derived from the principle of good
faith ("Treu und Glauben" sec 242 BGB[=Civil Code])
As everybody has the legal right to go to court people
nevertheless have to show that they are affected by
the act or that they have legal interests which can be
damaged if they are not taking legal actions
subjektive Rechtsverletzung = infringement of a right; VwGO
sec 42 (2) demands that there has to be the plausible
possibility of an injury of a subjective legal right / norm
which is guaranteed to the individual. Because the subj.
Rechtsverletzung is examined in the first part
(admissibility) of the judges examination he has to look
wether there is the likely chance and plausible possibility
that the individual is hurt through the act/order of the
agency. The question wether he really is hurt is a question
of the second part (success of the lawsuit)
Klageart suis generis = developed out of the guarantee of
legal protection of GG art 19 (4) and VwGO sec. 40
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therefore there is the possibility to take legal action
before an administrative court if the sUbject/act/rule is
one of public law (without beeing constitutional law) and
if the other requirements are fulfilled even if a certain
lawsuit is not explicitly guaranteed
formal/objective legitimacy (of the order/act) = there are
certain forms and procedures that have to be respected by
the agency before it acts in a certain way which are
required by law tro ensure equal treatment and reliance in
the procedure in which the agency decides to act and in the
sovereign in general.If there have been mistakes in this
formal part the order/act is void. If these formal
procedures have been used in the correct way by the agency
the second question is wether the legal rights of the
addressee of the act/orde have been hurt without a
justification.
suhjektives oeffentliches Recht = subjective public right;
there is a classification of legal rights in Germany:
(a) the subjective public right is a public legal right
given to the individual written down in statutes; with this
subjective public right he/she can demand a special
action/inaction from the government or the agencies acting
for it. It has to be made plausible that a subjective
public right may be harmed through the administrative
agency action, VwGO § 42 (2), as one of the requirements to
be admitted to court. Not everybody has the same subj.
public rights because these rights protect different things
like e.g. property, a certain living area, entitlement to a
special building permission etc.
(b) an objective legal right is not something an individual
can demand a certain action or protection from. Objective
legal rights just describe or regulate certain things which
are necessary to obtain in a society but which give no
178
legal title to anybody to demand a certain action from an
agency or the government
administrative act = a special legal term in Germany; the
administrative act is the type of action the agencies
choose to use in most cases; an administrative act (defined
in VwVfG § 35) is directed at an individual or a small
group of people (which still can be individualized) and
either orders the individual/group to do something or
benefits the adresse. An administrative act is legally
binding.
2) Selected Articles from the Grundgesetz:
Art 19 (Restriction of basic rights):
(1) In so far as a basic right may, under this Basic Law,
be restricted by or pursuant to a law, such law must apply
generally and not solely to an individual case.
Furthermore, such law must name the basic right,
indicating the Article concerned.
(2) In no case may the essential content of a basic right
be encroached upon.
(3) The basic rights shall apply also to domestic juristic
persons to the extent that the nature of such rights
permits.
(4) Should any person's right be violated by public
authority, recourse to the court shall be open to him. If
jurisdiction is not specified, recourse shall be to the
ordinary courts."
Art 20 (Basic principles of the constitution - Right to
resist):
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and
social federal state.
(2) All state authority emanates from the people. It shall
be exercised by the people by means of elections and
voting and by specific legislative, executive, and
judicial organs.
(3) Legislation shall be subject to the constitutional
order; the executive and the judiciary shall be bound by
law and justice.
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(4) All Germans shall have the right to resist any person
or persons seeking to abolish that constitutional order,
should no other remedy be possible.
Art 79 (3) = Amendments of this Basic Law affecting the
division of the Federation into states, the participation
on principle of states in legislation, or the basic
principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20, shall be
inadmissible.
Art 1 (Protection of human dignity)
(1) the dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and
protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.
(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and
inalienable human rights as the basic of every community,
of peace and justice in the world.
(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature,
the executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable
law.
- --------- -~ ---
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